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

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



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marginalia

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EDITORIAL:

Coexistence or No Existence

Not since 1950 has a single United States public official seen the Chinese mainland. Since 1950 United States policy has effectively eliminated every means of direct communication with Red China. Neither people nor goods are permitted to cross the containment barrier.

Prospects for peace in the world will remain illusory in the face of a continuance of the United States containment through isolation policy toward the People's Republic of China. In the apt words of Clare Boothe Luce, it is essential that we "find ways of living at peace with half the human race."

In the pursuit of this policy we stand virtually alone among the nations of the "free world." British, French and Japanese trade relations with mainland China continue to expand. The People's Republic is Pakistan's prime customer for cotton; it is an important market for dates from Iraq; the list of trade missions from West European countries and from Africa steadily mounts.

We are thus faced with much the same realities we found so discomforting to admit in our early post-World War II relations with the Soviet Union. But some things have changed, at least to the point where it is considerably more difficult for many who vilified Eleanor Roosevelt (Cardinal Spellman, for instance), to do the same to Mrs. Luce, who recognizes that "The alternatives facing the Chinese people today are death by mass starvation, or an internal revolution against Mao, or wars led by Mao for more raw materials and living room. If death is to be the daily diet of a people, we must not be surprised if they choose to die fighting like men for the means of survival."

Our negative, defensive, doctrinaire containment through isolation policy is self-defeating. To somehow continue to believe that we can ever succeed in isolating Mao's China from the rest of the world is just another retreat to Disneyland. The United States position of absolute power makes everything we do too important to the rest of the world to allow for the luxury of any more such excursions.

Last September, members of the Com-

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monwealth Club of California in San Francisco were told by David Rockefeller, "We (the United States and Red China) share an immense ignorance about each other and that should disturb us all. Where ignorance prevails, fear is born. Where fear takes root, frustration grows. Where frustration persists, recklessness ensues." Our recklessness will not be mitigated until we are willing to do more than retreat behind the containment wall and limit our contact with the vast sea of humanity on the other side to an occasional communique condemning it.

. . . the containment wall . . .

Ironically, United States policy makers who so readily succumbed to the "consensus" in shaping our Vietnam policy (see p. 20, this issue), seem totally impervious to a growing consensus favoring a resumption of trade with Red China. The Governor of California has openly deplored our containment policy: "Nothing feeds the cause of fanaticism and totalitarianism like isolation." In 1964 the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce called for limited trade with Communist China because it is "immoral to withhold food from hungry people." American Delegates to the International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union Biennial Convention in Vancouver, British Columbia, were rankled at the sight of a port full of ships engaged in commerce with The People's Republic, and renewed their commitment to a reversal of the policy which prevents the use of American west coast ports for the same purpose.

Those who opposed the principle of coexistence with Russia were wrong. The opponents of coexistence with The People's Republic of China are wrong, and for the same reason—because the alternative to coexistence is, ultimately, no existence.

LONDON: Budget Blues

London

By Terence Prittie

Britain's 20 post-war budgets have given the British people very little to cheer about. But probably only one of them, that of 1951, produced a worse fit of the blues than Mr. James Callaghan's budget of April 6, 1965. The British people, whom the Labour Party promised to revive and stimulate with bold, imaginative policies, has been given its biggest dose of austerity in 14 years. Nor should it be forgotten that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1951 was Sir Stafford Cripps, a man of truly frightening Puritanism and a political masochist who was easily the best advertisement for the dosages of economic castor-oil which he administered.

The British, too, as a race have a strongly masochistic trend of mind. Thanks to television they were able to gloat for hour after hour over their own miseries. One TV network devised the ideal way of depicting the full extent of these miseries by showing every half-hour or so a list of tax increases which wore as many holes in the poor man's pockets as in the rich man's heart. The tax-increase of sixpence (roughly 7 cents) on a pack of 20 cigarettes may not look too formidable, but it put 14 percent onto the price. No one will feel it more than the Labour Party's darlings, the old-age pensioners, whose cigarette and glass of beer are principal compensations. The one penny more a pint he must pay for the latter put its price up by a comparatively modest 6 percent.

Mr. Callaghan missed very few potential victims for his increased taxes. The taxpayer's standard rate of income-tax went up by sixpence in the pound. His automobile license was up by 2.10 pounds ($7.00) for the year, or 15 percent. His postage for a letter mailed anywhere in the British Isles had already been raised, as a pre-budget appetiser, by 25 percent. Now, Mr. Callaghan clamped 25 percent more tax on a bottle of port or sherry, 22 percent on a bottle of gin or Scotch, 12 percent on a medium quality table wine and an un-Christian 16 percent on a **vin ordinaire.** Unwise as well as un-Christian, for the British need a little more iron in their constitutions if they are to absorb many more budgetary shocks.

. . . an un-Christian 16 percent . . .

All in all, Labour's new taxes since coming into office last November will take nearly 500 million pounds ($1.40 billion) from the taxpayer in a full year. Mr. Edward Heath, the Conservative "Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer," contrasted this figure with the reductions in taxation of 1.30 billion pounds ($3.72 billion) which Conservative governments have managed to allow over the last 13 years. Maybe they allowed too much, but that is another story.

Mr. Callaghan's budget has to be seen against the background of the Labour Party's election promises, made in a spirit of rare abandon last summer and fall. Then, the Labour Party promised to increase salaries and pensions, spend more on roads and housing, maintain

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:nce Prittie

Britain's defence forces at the requisite level and move the economy forward at a brisk and businesslike pace—and all this without having recourse to a cent of additional taxation. These multitudinous benefits were to be paid for in the easiest way imaginable—out of a national revenue which would increase "naturally" as a result of the planned expansion of the national economy. Labour's leaders predicted an annual increase in the Gross National Product of between 4 and 6 percent, against the bare 2½ percent which Conservative governments had achieved.

How is the Labour Government going to get its 4 to 6 percent rate of increase in the GNP? Certainly, Mr. Callaghan's budget has given no indication whatever. Instead the Chancellor has outlined the following measures which will be directly damaging to the British economy.

Corporation Tax on industrial companies has been raised to a potential ceiling of 40 percent. This is a prohibitive rate, prohibitive, that is, to the planned expansion which the Labour government wants. The Corporation Tax is, further, to be used as a weapon to encourage the ploughing-back of profits in industry and to discourage the raising of dividend payments. In the short term this may do no harm; in the long term it will discourage investment in industry.

A new Capital Gains Tax was included in the budget, which will have a similar effect. For it will not only place a penal tax on profits made by the buying and selling of stocks within a 12-month period; it will impose a 30 percent tax on gains made on assets held by individuals for more than a year. This provision will adversely affect investment in the sort of "growth" company which it is precisely the government's intention to encourage.

Finally, Mr. Callaghan has decided that the "direction of policy" with regard to overseas investment should be changed. Britain's total stock of long-term assets abroad had apparently risen by the end of last year to 11 billion pounds ($30.80 billion). Far from being pleased with this, Mr. Callaghan expressed disapproval. Overseas trade corporations will no longer enjoy profits tax and income tax concessions. This will hit a company like Bowater Paper, which has built up a large and immensely valuable business in the United States and Canada. Bowater's shares took a quick plunge on the stock market on April 7. It will hit a company like Hudson's Bay, virtually all of whose business is done in Canada but which has "domiciled" itself in London. Hudson's Bay has an easy answer: to change its domicile to Canada. The loser will be the British Treasury.

. . . a quick plunge . . .

. . . painfully obvious . . .

The fallacy in Mr. Callaghan's thinking is painfully obvious. Britain has lost an Empire and huge sources of comparatively easily acquired wealth. Deprived of overseas assets, she has been thrown back on her ability to manufacture, trade and manipulate money. This has put an undeniable strain on her economy and she has found it very difficult to adjust herself to her new role. (Her population has multiplied more than seven times since she became a major colonial power in the 18th century.)

But many Britons have been wise in their generation and have built up assets abroad which are of vital importance to the national economy. This is something which all geographically small and overpopulated countries are well-advised to do. Britain's income from her overseas investments is, after all, probably around $1.40 billion a year and may be as high as $2 billion. Mr. Callaghan is discouraging the further growth of this income, on the grounds that British money is needed at home—as if money were a sort of bullion specie which must be hoarded in the vaults of the bank or in the peasant's mattress.

The discouraging of investment abroad may turn out to be the worst feature of the Labour budget. But it will be only one of a great many factors which will ensure the unhappy spectacle during the next twelvemonth of the British people tightening their belts, keeping stiff upper lips and moving one step farther along the road leading to national insolvency. The Labour government has already evaded dealing with the growing problems of the coal industry. It will, if it keeps its rashest promise of all, embark shortly on the nationalisation of the steel industry — which may be the biggest body-blow of all to the economy. It is engaged in drawing up an economic "master plan," about which one must have the gravest misgivings. For it is being done in a hurry and it is being done by the Minister of Economics, Mr. George Brown, a man of unpredictable frame of mind and wildly erratic genius. It is, in any event, doubtful whether the British people need a master plan. It simply needs to work harder, and it should be the duty of a good government to point this out to every member of the community.

. . . the biggest body-blow . . .

If, indeed, the national economy starts to rally, it will be due to a late-in-the-day realisation that hard work is the only thing which can save Britain, and not to

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Mr. Callaghan's budget. But—and this is the saddest thing of all to have to say about one's own country — the British people have lately shown no more ability than is needed to get off the ground, just, in order to sink back again in a mood of apathy tinged with self-satisfaction. But, of course, the writer who can say this lays himself open to the charge of being the worst masochist of all.

CINEMA: The Perils of Pauline (Kael)

By Stanley Eichelbaum

Motion pictures being the most massive, mass-profit, mass-inspired, mass-consumed and potentially mesmeric of the arts, it should not surprise anyone that movie criticism is an abortive, thankless and frustrating occupation. The critic may strive to educate, enlighten and inform—to elevate public tastes, if possible—but his efforts are almost certainly doomed to defeat.

He must forget his silly ideas he might have about performing a divine mission and do as James Agee did when he started a film column for **The Nation** by telling his readers, with disarming wisdom, "It is my business to conduct one end of a conversation as an amateur critic among amateur critics."

Otherwise, he may find himself in the thwarted position of a street cleaner working against a high wind. He may scold the movie-makers for littering the marketplace with garbage, but the trash will pile up anyway and the year's top grossing films will include, as they did in 1964, abominations like **The Carpetbaggers, Irma la Douce** and **What a Way to Go!**

There are the art films, of course, to nourish the critic's pride, to be coddled and commended for serious movie buffs whose intelligence is not to be insulted. But then, an outstanding movie will come along, like the chilling and imaginative Japanese allegory, **Woman in the Dunes,** and he will call it brilliant and hope to arouse interest.

In the case of **Woman in the Dunes,** it opened in San Francisco to the highest critical acclaim. It was nominated for an Academy Award. But the Presidio Theater never grossed more than $5,100 per week and two months later, when the management decided to enter the nudie-exploitation field, its next attraction, a crude pot-boiler called **Sin in the Suburbs,** broke a house record with the first week's take of $17,000.

. . . a crude pot-boiler . . .

It also does very little for a critic's morale to dismiss **John Goldfarb, Please Come Home** as a childish and clumsy joke book scarcely worth going to court over (Notre Dame University vs. 20th Century-Fox) and then read in **Variety** that the movie grossed $235,000 the first week of its New York engagements.

Describing a film as "vulgar" and "tasteless" will only drive people into the theaters. And I have never known a movie-maker who was in any way stirred or influenced by reviews, not even the conscientious independent producer, who must, after all, make money, if he is to attract financial backing for his next project. Unlike the painter, who continues to create even without selling one canvas, the film-maker must have recognition, since his art is simply too expensive to store in a closet.

Is it any wonder, then, that commerce dominates the film industry? And if producers have no respect for reviews (only the box-office), does it serve any purpose for exasperated critics to alienate their readers by squealing like stuck pigs when they are affronted by the mediocrity of a movie, as though each bad film were a personal insult?

. . . squealing like stuck pigs . . .

Producers and directors aren't quite the fools they sometimes appear to be. Their product is aimed at a specific audience and today, teenagers constitute half the movie public. I see an average of five films a week, so many of them so dreadful that I occasionally overpraise an unusual or semi-literate picture, thinking that it has something original to say, merely because my sensibilities have been dulled by all the others.

Nonetheless, I am consistently amazed at the gradual awakening of film-makers to the fact that a more discriminating public exists and that mature themes and creative films do not necessarily insure failure. So among those top grossers of 1964, oddly enough, were such superior movies as **Tom Jones, Charade, Dr. Strangelove** and **Beckett.**

And I would agree with James Agee's astute comment: "If you compare the moving pictures released during a given period with the books published during the same period—or with the plays produced or the pictures painted or the music composed—you may or may not be surprised to find that they stand up rather well."

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But if you read Pauline Kael's recent book, **I Lost It at the Movies** (Atlantic-Little Brown; $6), you will find the gloomy pronouncement that "movies are going to pieces; they're disintegrating." Miss Kael is a California scribe who once dispensed her angry words about films on a weekly radio program.

. . . a vestal virgin . . .

She has now assembled her educational station scripts and various magazine articles in a lively and provoking volume that discusses some 50 films, most of them from the last decade. Like a vestal virgin guarding the wispy flame of cinema art, Miss Kael has a schoolmarmish way of scolding movie-makers, movie critics and even the movie public, for not conforming to her very unconventional, waspish pattern of thinking.

Her exacerbating, hell-for-leather onslaughts are by no means dull, though it seems she "despises" too many films than is justified in a woman who has chosen to be a professional movie-goer. I wouldn't venture to guess what Miss Kael lost at the movies, but it would appear from her whimsical title that the Perils of Pauline included a symbolic case of rape by those insidious forces determined to undermine Miss Kael's sanctimonious standards for the film industry.

While Miss Kael has nothing but scorn for Hollywood ("It dislocates my values"), she considers herself an ambivalent critic, and this indeed she is, since her tastes are remarkably unpredictable.

commercial pap . . .

Oddly enough, she enjoyed Jerry Lewis in **The Nutty Professor,** but hated **Hiroshima, Mon Amour.** She vastly enjoyed commercial pap like **The Pink Panther** (though I didn't mind it myself) and found ruinous faults in important films, like **A Taste of Honey** and **8½.** Most insensitively, she accused Antonioni of removing the essential element of light from **Eclipse** and Ingmar Bergman of stripping the essential sound from **The Silence.** And then, she has the affrontery of slashing into **other** critics for their opinions—for what she calls "sheer not-getting-to-the-point."

In one of these irritable broadsides, she ridicules me for disliking Jean-Luc Godard's **Breathless** (an opinion I vigorously uphold). She chides me for describing it as "a hodge-podge" and for my inability to warm up to its sinister hero and heroine. Yet Miss Kael goes on to debunk **Last Year at Marienbad** (with admirable skill, I might add), commenting that "Resnais cuts away something that is basic to drama—our caring about the characters and what they are doing."

According to Miss Kael, the nation's movie critics are involved in a conspiracy. They are "a destructive bunch of solidly, stupidly respectable mummies," all of them scheming to keep the public away from Miss Kael's preferred films. And she is embarrassing in her blind rages against Bosley Crowther, the **New York Times** reviewer, whose influential standing seems to send Miss Kael into fits of agony. "I regard criticism as an art," she says self-importantly, "and if in this country and in this age it is practiced with honesty, it is no more remunerative than the work of an avant-garde film artist."

. . . "I can do without brothers" . . .

She therefore damns all the critics who admired **West Side Story** ("Sometimes, when I read film critics, I think I can do without brothers") and laments the dubious fact that flicks like **Singin' in the Rain** and **Top Hat** aren't being made anymore. She also blasts at **Hud,** giving it far more social meaning than it really had, because its producer and director obviously were "screwing the system," by glorifying materialism in a "schizoid" and "dishonest" film.

When Miss Kael isn't tripping over her own words, she writes fairly well. She has fantastic powers of total recall. And though she resorts to unflattering crudi-

Pauline Kael

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ties, her intellect is remarkable and her style is vivid and stimulating. Moreover, she certainly has the courage of her convictions (and restrictions). "A critic who follows rules will fail in one of his most important functions," she writes, "perceiving what is original and important in new work and helping others to see." But isn't this self-evident, Miss Kael?

Like a few other critics who feel superior to the films they are reviewing, Miss Kael calls attention to herself (and away from the films) with fierce, stinging, searing invective. Dwight Macdonald uses a similar technique in his egotistic, but literate essays in **Esquire.** He hammers away at almost any popular film, like **My Fair Lady,** which he deplores as "a banana split," adding that "Frederic Loewe is not Mozart and Alan Jay Lerner is not Lorenzo Da Ponte."

Miss Kael, incidentally, admires Macdonald—one of the few she has a kind word for. She is suspicious of all the others, even Stanley Kaufmann and England's Penelope Gilliatt, two of the brightest critics in the business. As for the daily newspaper reviewers, Miss Kael thinks they are lower than dirt and completely under the thumb of the film industry, which bribes them with expensive junkets to Hollywood.

Hypocritically or not, Miss Kael then describes just such a Hollywood junket she herself accepted. The junkets, by the way, are harmless devices for advance publicity, interesting for a critic, who is offered an opportunity to meet directors and performers and observe movie-making. A feature story about a film production usually results from these travels. And I know of no reputable critic who would be swayed by a star's smile or a free drink with a director. I have never been coerced into a favorable review of a picture, after participating in a junket. Nor have I ever felt obliged to lay off a picture.

. . . a free drink with a director . . .

It would appear that Miss Kael is a snob. And for all her intelligence and knowledge, she falls under Paul Valery's definition of a true snob—the person who is afraid to admit he was bored when he was bored. Consequently, Miss Kael has this to say about Satyajit Ray's **Apu Trilogy:** "What Ray has to give is so rich, so contemplative in approach, that we begin to accept our lapses of attention during the tedious moments with the same kind of relaxation and confidence and affection that we feel for the boring stretches in the great novels, the epic poems." **Now really, Pauline!**

LETTERS:
More Bellows on Bellow

Sirs:

Have just read Mr. Geismar's ferocious attack on **Herzog.** Oddly enough I was just reading, rather by fits and starts, the book itself. It is not really a novel of course; a kind of rag-bag, and very irritating, though occasionally he offers one a scene or a good phrase. Mr. Geismar seems to me a bit too fierce with him, but then of course I've not read those reviews calling it a masterpiece, which is ridiculous. I wish novelists would start writing novels again.

. . . a kind of rag-bag . . .

J. B. Priestley
Stratford-on-Avon
England

Sirs:

Just read what Mr. Geismar had said of **Herzog.** Sure was strong and true, and proper! A couple of more monumental "triumphs" like **Herzog** and Bellow will be done for. Thing of it all is, with **Herzog** and 15 cents, I could just about get into the IRT.

Alan Kapelner
New York City

Sirs:

I have just read Mr. Geismar's review of Bellow's **Herzog** in Ramparts and want to express my appreciation for such an excellent review. I, too, read many of those rave reviews and immediately ordered the novel, and I have never been so disappointed in a novel since Hemingway's **Across the River. Herzog** was a novel that I would have gladly left unfinished had it not been for the unanimous praise it received from the reviews and my friends who had read it. After all, I said to myself, how could so many good critics be so wrong; it must be me. So I went on to the end, looking for the excellence but finding only pretentious intellectual hi-jinks. I felt completely alone until I read your review, which, although one of the shorter reviews I have read on the novel, was packed with more sense than all the others combined.

. . . intellectual hi-jinks . . .

John Antico
Lansing, Michigan

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fan and non-fan mail

Sirs:

Your ideals in publishing seem very appealing to me. I hope they bring you rich financial rewards so you can keep publishing. Truth should be the aim of every sincere publisher . . . You seem committed to truth's victory and harsh reality. Please stay free from the realm of bitterness and acrimony and I'm sure all your readers will appreciate your honesty and academic integrity. The list of editors is exceptional, I think, in the publishing field because there are so many distinguished ones working on this one publication. Congratulations.

John Hoffman
St. Mary's Seminary
Baltimore, Maryland

Sirs:

It goes without saying that we were impressed both by the format and the contents of your April issue. Though I may not agree with everything you say, it is refreshing to have another point of view. Because of the clamor caused here in Rome by the prohibition of "The Vicar," I found your article on "The Comforter" particularly interesting . . .

Your position is necessarily a difficult one, and I sincerely hope you will be able to maintain it in true Christian charity.

Again expressing my thanks for your kind attention, and promising our prayers for the success of your work, I remain,

(Bro.) Charles Walter
Rome, Italy

. . so-called dirty word issue . . .

Sirs:

To you and Dr. Neal Blumenfeld the highest congratulations for that rarest of rare things these days: a competent, honest, insightful, sane treatment of the Berkeley (U. of Cal.) issue.

The questions the students are posing —even, or particularly in the so-called dirty word issue—are so clear and high-minded that it is impossible honestly to mistake them, and vicious to misrepresent them. They are asking in the plainest manner possible as to the moral basis of the authority that claims to direct them, and as to the plain everyday honesty of their "governors."

The answers so far have mostly been weasel words—or pregnant silence. They find this intolerable—and so do I.

John R. Seeley
Professor of Sociology
Brandeis University

Sirs:

Your magazine is outrageous; your April article on Pope Pius XII is despicable . . . God help us. Kindly remove us from your files.

James A. Cunniffe, S.C.J. Rector
Robert L. Meyer, S.C.J. Councilor
Dehon Seminary
Great Barrington, Massachusetts

. . John Birchers seem like saints . . .

Sirs:

I must say that I never knew such trash was printed. **Ramparts** represents all that is debilitating in a sick society. You do have some worthwhile ideas such as equal rights and the welfare of mankind —but what sensitive man doesn't believe in these things? Your solutions are those of men who languish in the chimerical and are completely devoid of common sense. The result is slanted-news, full of acrimony and vilification, with the accent on the indecent and destructive. By comparison the John Birchers seem like saints.

After reading your two issues, I have gained a far greater understanding of Patrick Henry. Should your world become reality, I would choose death.

L. E. Harmon
Deputy Commander
Operational Test and
Evaluation Force, Pacific
U. S. Naval Air Station, North Island
San Diego, California

Sirs:

Your recent editorial comment on Msgr. Knott's position on birth control was courageous and very apropos. A person like myself feels the need for a more clearly defined and contemporary interpretation of the problem by the Church. Should I follow my conscience, which tells me to take the reasonable path of action, or must I "toe the line" in blind obedience?

Also may I include my congratulations on the publication of a very fine magazine. I don't agree with all of your opinions but your editorial positions seem honest and conscientious.

Richard J. Bauman
Windsor, Ontario

Barbie's friends



Sirs:

I have read your coments (sic) on Barbie Dolls. I disagree with you very much.

I find a Barbie Doll is just as hard to keep up economically as any other doll. She is not a sex symbol, nor a bad influence. She is just the same as a "Toni," "Little Miss Revelon (sic)," and many more dolls which I can think of. If Barbie influences children to grow up faster, the children would not want to play with dolls, or think about dolls at all. There-

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fore, the children forget about the "sexy side" of a Barbie Doll, if any.

Sooner or later, girls must learn about boys. With Ken, they will learn that boys are sweet and kind. When the time comes to learn about boys, in detail, they will learn from their mother, or another great source, like experence (sic). You said, "With Barbie, girls learn to expect to be valued by an ever-increasing wardrobe and their ability to manipulate their fathers and, later their husbands into buying clothes, and more clothes." This is not true in many cases. If it is not true in one case, this statement is false. A lot of people can not aford (sic) to spend the money on all the clothes and friends of Barbie. But, mostly every girl has a Barbie Doll. Therefore parents think differently about Barbie Dolls than you do. If they thought a Barbie Doll was a sex symbol, and a bad influence on their children, their children wouldn't have one. A baby doll is no different than a Barbie in some cases. First of all, it needs a bottle and maybe other clothes. There are cribs, swings, strolers (sic), etc. and the children might get those things. They manipulate their fathers, and later husbands, for clothes and accesories (sic). It might give a child the urge to go out and have a baby, when they are under age. Some of this too is caused by the parents letting their child go quicker than others.

. . . manipulate their fathers . . .

As any other doll, Barbie has its good qualities as well as its bad. It must have good qualities, or else it would have been out of business long ago. "Barbie and her friends," were put out to make money, just like any other doll, toy, etc. As you can see it made a lot of succes (sic).

Eloise Marion (age 12)
Los Angeles, California

Sirs:

I think that the article on Barbie in your April **Ramparts** was unfair. Girls don't have all those Barbie clothes as Donovan Bess implied. Women have lots of clothes to look at, yet they don't buy them all.

Also, Barbie isn't a person. She is what the person who owns her wants her to be —from princess to witches, almost never "glamor girls."

Debbie Lawton (Age 11)
Riverside, California

Sirs:

Hurrah for your article on the Barbie dolls! Incidentally, for what it's worth, Ken and Barbie are physiologically incapable of kneeling.

The Rev. Albert J. Colton
San Francisco, California

THE COVER:
Ho Chi Minh Crossing The Delaware

It was, at first, of course, only a wild flight of fancy. "How do you see Ho Chi Minh?" we asked RAMPARTS ace cover artist Justin Murray.

"As Washington crossing the Delaware, of course," Murray replied. **Of course.** And we all laughed.

Upon sufficient reflection, however, we realized that Murray had come up with a grain of wisdom from the chicken-growing country of Petaluma, California, where he resides.

The history of Vietnam is a history of a people struggling against the troops of outside nations. First, for centuries, the Chinese. Then the French. Then the Japanese. Then the French again. Now, a majority of the population is fighting the Americans.

Murray's cover brings home a primary point that most American's do not realize: Ho Chi Minh, our enemy, is the great revolutionary hero of modern Vietnam. He fought the Japanese. He defeated the French. Now he is the symbol of the fight against the Americans, whose degree of popularity in Vietnam is only rivaled by the Gallup rating of the British just before the Boston Tea Party.

The coke bottles in the river are, of course, a modern touch. Everywhere, one encounters the effects of massive American Aid.

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N EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

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RAMPARTS takes great pleasure in announcing the establishment of its new Editorial Board comprised of Arthur A. Cohen, William Stringfellow and Edward M. Keating.

This Board was formed in order to more fully reflect the editorial policy of RAMPARTS, stemming from the Judeo-Christian perspective of man and the world. There is an ever increasing need for mutual participation by the three major religious faiths in the cultural and social issues of contemporary society. Too long Catholics, Protestants and Jews have spoken to each other over the picket fences that traditionally circumscribe each religious community.

With the convergence of these three religious perspectives in RAMPARTS, there will be discussions from time to time among the three Board members. There is no intention to reduce everything to common consensus since a deeply committed Protestant, a deeply committed Jew and a deeply committed Catholic comprise the Board—united by a mutuality of respect for each other's convictions.

Moreover, the members of the Board are boun together by their deep concern and love for Amer ica. At this stage of world and American histor it is crucial that the essential character of Americ and Americans be reaffirmed. Such reaffirmation fundamentally *moral and revolutionary;* moral, a having everything to do with human conduct an revolutionary as continuing to improve our master over the use of change. If America and American lose their ability for moral indignation and if the become afraid of change, there is no future for u for freedom and for democracy. To be revolution ary (that is, to change) is necessary for it helps t prevent the moral approach from becoming doc trinaire. On the other hand, moral concern the lifeblood of human relations as they chang throughout history.

Thus, RAMPARTS' new Board represents an ef fort to combine that which is greatest in all of us love of God and love of fellowman. We range in a directions in RAMPARTS, but always we return t that fundamental starting point: God and man.

The Editors

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EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Arthur A. Cohen *is Editor-in-Chief of the Trade Department of Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc. He was President of Meridian Books which he founded in 1955 and 1960 he became Vice President of World Publishing Company upon its acquisition of Meridian Books. In 1961 he was appointed Director of the Religious Department of Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc. Mr. Cohen received his B.A. from the University of Chicago in 1946 and his M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1949 and was a Fellow in Medieval Jewish Philosophy at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, New York, from 1951 to 1953. His books include* Martin Buber *(1958),* The Natural And The Supernatural Jew: An Historical And Theological Introduction *(1963) and he has a novel in progress. He is a frequent contributor to many journals, including* Worldview, The Commonweal, Harper's Magazine, Partisan Review *and* Cross Currents. *In addition, Mr. Cohen is a member of the Advisory Council of the Institute for Advanced Judaic Studies at Brandeis University, the Editorial Board of* Judaism, *and the Board of Institute of Church and State at Villanova University.*

William Stringfellow, *a practicing attorney in New York, is also an established author and lecturer. He is best known for his book* My People Is The Enemy, *published in 1964, but his writings also include* Free in Obedience, Instead of Death *and* A Private And Public Faith. *He is a graduate of the Harvard Law School (1956), Bates College (1949) and was a Rotary Fellow at the London School of Economics (1950). After graduation from law school he lived and practiced law in the East Harlem section of New York City. His law firm still devotes a large part of its work to the underprivileged in this and other parts of the city. In 1962 he was one of six "young American theologians," and the only layman, to participate in a public dialogue with Karl Barth at the University of Chicago. Active in the ecumenical movement since his days as a leader of the World's Student Christian Federation, he has traveled in thirty-six countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America and he now represents the Episcopal Church in the United States on the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches. He is a member of the Board of the Church Society for College Work of the Episcopal Church, and has been a Special Deputy Attorney General of New York, consultant to the New York State Commission Against Discrimination and a witness before the President's Committee on Narcotics. His military service with the Second Armored Division won him three commendations.*

Edward M. Keating, *founder and Editor-in-Chief of* Ramparts, *is a graduate of Stanford University (A.B. 1948) and the Stanford Law School (L.LB. 1950). He has been an active participant in the Negro Civil Rights Movement in the United States, in the role of private citizen and as Editor-in-Chief of* Ramparts. *During the past several years Mr. Keating has demonstrated a keen interest in the growing ecumenical spirit of America's three major religions, and has responded with intensity to the demands of "renewal and reform" in his own Catholic Church. Last year he received the Brotherhood Award from a chapter of B'nai B'rith. His book,* The Scandal of Silence — *"A layman's powerful critique of the Catholic Church in America" — was published recently by Random House. Mr. Keating resides with his wife and five children in Atherton, California.*

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

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SOUTHEAST ASIA
A SPECIAL REPORT

The Unreasonable Question

The virgin issue in our Vietnam policy is the moral one. The Lilliputian measures of public dissent have been couched in supremely practical terms: How are we going about the war? Should we be escalating or negotiating? Are our policies efficient? Are we winning?

These are reasonable questions, asked by reasonable men. The *unreasonable* question—the seemingly unutterable question is—*why?*

But this is the essential query. It is what must be asked before any rational discussion of policy alternatives is possible. It is the question RAMPARTS asks in this special issue on the moral disaster of our Southeast Asia policy.

***Why* is the public told America was *asked* to step into Vietnam, when our initial involvement was actually installing, financing and arming a despotic and unpopular premier as a "democratic alternative" to the overwhelming grass-roots popularity of the Communist guerillas? (P. 16)**

***Why* do people still believe that Southeast Asia is ready to fall, country-by-country, like dominos into the Communist axis, when Asian nations are in reality complex, perverse and independent—like Cambodia where a King can feel comfortable as a Socialist and an anti-Communist at the same time? (PP. 25 and 34)**

***Why* do serious, concrete, non-Establishment proposals for peace (P. 41) stand so little chance of being heard and understood by American policy makers?**

***Why*—and this is the most disturbing question of all—why is there no significant number of Americans asking these questions? Is the age of consensus that complete? Or have we lost all capacity for moral outrage?**

The Cold War and its hot complexes are no longer as simple-minded as they appeared in the late 1940s. This is a post-Vandenberg era: foreign policy should be *debatable*. Indeed, it *must* be debated if this country is to rid itself of the clumsy, generous, para-missionary, quasi-gangbusters crazyquilt of little reality that has covered our bipartisan foreign policy through four administrations.

There can be no better place to begin such a debate than over our Southeast Asia policy. We *know* it doesn't work. Let us ask *why*.

—The Editors.

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

THE "VIETNAM LOBBY"

by Robert Scheer & Warren Hinckle

AMONG THE STACKS of wood-based engravings filed in dusty pyramids in *The New Leader's* editorial offices is a generously-sized, full-faced reproduction of the late Ngo Dinh Diem.

The typed label on the back that used to identify Diem as "Vietnam's Democratic Alternative" has been torn off. The steel plate is worn from rubbing, face down, against the shellacked surface of the public school surplus-type furniture in the magazine's quarters in the old social democratic Rand School Building on New York's still-cobblestoned 15th Street.

The New Leader's cut file is a strange place to begin the story of the "Vietnam Lobby," but then it is a strange

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

story. It is the history of a small and enthusiastic group of people—including a Cardinal, an ex-Austrian Socialist leader, and a CIA agent—who maneuvered the Eisenhower administration and the American press into supporting the rootless, unpopular and hopeless regime of a despot and believed it actually was all an exercise in democracy. That this group was able to accomplish this against the better thoughts of Eisenhower and over the traditional wariness of the press is testimony to its power and its persuasiveness. Another chapter of the history of the "Vietnam Lobby" is how its thesis came to be accepted by a broad consensus of liberals and intellectuals in America—a consensus that only recently has begun to splinter and is still largely intact.

The thesis is based on an overriding belief in the beauty of the American way of life—and in the nefarious nature of communism. It is the belief that the only reason a nation might vote Communistic is because it hasn't been properly exposed to the Democratic way of life: If a people know democracy, they will vote Democratic. And if it becomes necessary on occasion to tolerate undemocratic means to achieve the ultimate democratic goal—well, it is all for the people's own good.

For *The New Leader*, a liberal, militantly anti-Communist bi-weekly with a strong belief in social reform,

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this theory was naturally applicable to the case of Diem, a firm anti-Communist. *The New Leader* in 1959 hailed Diem's "Democratic One Man Rule." To the school of liberalism where anti-communism is the *sine qua non*, the idea of a "Democratic One Man Rule" is not an anomoly.

The story of the "Vietnam Lobby" is a case study in American politics from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, and the role of *The New Leader* in that period is worth singling out for special attention because the magazine played a smaller but similar role in spreading the thesis of the nation's most famous pressure group—The China Lobby. The disillusioned idealists and ex-radicals that C. Wright Mills once dubbed "The NATO intellectuals" were prominent in both lobbies. Like *The New Leader*, they were willing to believe the best about anything or anyone anti-Communist.

THE HISTORY OF THE "VIETNAM LOBBY" dates from a meeting in a Tokyo tea room in 1950. There Wesley Fishel, a young Michigan State University political scientist, had a serious conversation with Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was in the 17th year of a self-imposed exile. A sort of Catholic mandarin, he was by family background, personal inclination and training, a member of Vietnam's feudal aristocracy. The Mandarin sense of survival called for cooperation with the French, and Diem had risen to the rank of Governor of Phat Diem Province in the French colonial civil service. A militant anti-Communist, in 1933 he helped the French fight the Communists who were then leading the Vietnamese anti-colonial revolt. But Diem decided that France and Vietnam were incompatible, and went into exile. It is illustrative of his character that he chose voluntary exile rather than remain in his country and fight with the "masses" (which included the Communists) against the French. Diem was a firm believer in the ways of God dictating the acts of men. He would wait for some Hegelian force to sweep him back onto the center-stage of his country's history. Providence, in 1950, took the form of Wesley Fishel.

The young professor was impressed by Diem's long wait to rule his country and his views on independent nationalism, anti-communism and social reform. Fishel urged Diem to come to the United States to seek this government's support. When Diem agreed, Fishel arranged for Michigan State to sponsor the trip. On the Michigan State campus, Diem found kinship and support among both faculty and administration—a relationship which later developed into the university's extensive aid project to Diem's government, where a team of some 20 professors did everything from drafting his budgets to training his secret police. Outside the academic world, Diem found support in the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Diem's brother, Bishop Can, arranged for the Vietnamese exile to stay in Maryknoll seminaries in New Jersey and New York. This was Cardinal Spellman's territory, and the Cardinal and the Vietnamese Mandarin soon developed a close relationship. And no wonder. Diem was an anti-Communist *and* he was a Catholic. His brother was even a Bishop. One could not approach the Cardinal with better credentials.

In addition to the academicians and the clerics, Diem found to his surprise that he had a strong appeal with American liberals and intellectuals. When Diem was in the United States, from 1950 to 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy was on the loose and liberals felt it mandatory to show their anti-communism. The liberal-intellectual world was still quaking from the shocks of the loss of China, the Korean War, and the conviction of Alger Hiss. To suggest dealing with Communists—*any* Communists—on any terms was unthinkable in this climate. Yet Communist forces in Asia had monopolized the undeniably popular twin battle cries: nationalism and social reform. The liberals searched for a "third way." They thought they found it in the anti-Communist Diem as the leader of a "free" Vietnam. To think that the Vietnamese people would suddenly give to an absentee aristocrat the credit and gratitude for the fruits of the 20-year anti-colonial war the Communists had been leading against the French was, to say the least, naïvely optimistic. It also ignored Vietnamese history. It proved disastrous. The same tragic results were to occur a decade later when, again ignoring recent history, the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations followed the same fruitless military path of the French before them.

One of the first liberals to openly champion Diem was inveterate traveler, Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. Justice Douglas had just returned, discouraged, from a visit to Vietnam. An influx of American military aid hadn't helped the French in their losing war against Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh forces. The Viet Minh clearly had the support of the people; but the Viet Minh were Communist-led, and thus clearly unacceptable as leaders of Vietnam. Then Douglas met Diem in Washington, and became enthusiastic. The Justice arranged a breakfast with Senators Mike Mansfield and John F. Kennedy and introduced them to Diem. Both men were taken with him. And during the next few years, before Dien Bien Phu, both Mansfield and Kennedy were extremely critical of the French presence in Vietnam and of the Eisenhower Administration's support of them.

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They called for an "independent nationalist alternative," a phrase which later was to become a cliché. Kennedy, in a major speech immediately before the Geneva conference in April of 1954, warned against any negotiated solution that would allow participation in the Vietnamese government by Ho Chi Minh. The Communists, he said, would then eventually take over because they were so popular. Instead, he called for an independent—i.e., a Democratic and anti-Communist—Vietnam, supported by the United States. This Vietnam Diem was to lead.

The Geneva Conference, of course, called for no such thing. It affirmed the independence of the colonial government of Vietnam and called for an end to hostilities. A sort of interim trustee arrangement was agreed upon whereby the French would preside in the south and the Viet Minh in the north for two years, ending in national elections in 1956 when the Vietnamese people would choose their own government. Those elections were never held because the "Vietnam Lobby" didn't want them. Clearly, Ho Chi Minh would have won a popular vote—and that would have been the end of the "independent nationalistic alternative."

Thus men as diverse in their backgrounds as Spellman, Douglas and Kennedy—not to mention John Foster Dulles—came to support an aggressive policy against a popular adversary in the name of freedom and to believe in it.



THE TELEPHONE OPERATOR in the Chancery was used to such things, but even she blinked a little when Cardinal Spellman picked up the telephone and said: "Get me Joe Kennedy." When these two powerful men got on the line together, one winter afternoon in 1955, they settled quickly, as men of decision do, the steps that had to be taken to swing the wavering Eisenhower Administration solidly behind the young regime of Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. The report of this extraordinary conversation comes from Joseph Buttinger, an official of the International Rescue Committee, who was sitting in Spellman's office. Buttinger had just returned from Saigon, and he brought bad news. Diem's administration was in trouble. Buttinger thought Diem was the only hope of Vietnam, but needed to consolidate his power. There was opposition from the Vietnamese, from the French, and from some key Americans. Diem could not survive without increased United States support, yet the present United States commitment appeared in danger of waning. Eisenhower's special Ambassador to Vietnam, General Lawton Collins, was openly sceptical of Diem's ability to establish a viable regime. The journalist Joseph Alsop felt Diem's base of support was too narrow to effectively rival the popular Viet Minh. Eisenhower himself was not particularly sympathetic to Diem. The General recognized Ho Chi Minh's popularity, and was opposed to the effort to install an "alternative" as both undemocratic and of dubious success, as he later remarked in his book *Mandate for Change*.

But the Eisenhower Administration, not noted for its rigidity of purpose, was vulnerable to the political pressures marshalled by Cardinal Spellman and the elder Kennedy. Kennedy arranged for Buttinger to meet with Senator Mansfield and some key State Department personnel in Washington. His son, Senator John F. Kennedy, was in California, but Buttinger had a long conversation with the Senator's assistant, Ted Sorenson. Spellman took care of the press. He set up meetings for Buttinger with editors of The New York Times, the editorial board of the Herald-Tribune, and key editors of both *Time* and *Life*. Two days later the Times printed an editorial containing the Buttinger thesis. Buttinger himself took pen in hand and wrote an article for *The Reporter* praising Diem as democracy's "alternative" in Southeast Asia.

To fully appreciate Buttinger's role in the "Vietnam Lobby" it is necessary to go back to Diem's ascendance to the premiership in July, 1954. The new premier from his first day in office began to crush all opposition and concentrate power within a small, nepotistic group. Diem's targets included the private armies of the religious sects, anti-Communist Vietnamese leaders who made the mistake of also being anti-Diem, and the identifiable Viet Minh partisans remaining in South Vietnam. This did not make for popular acclaim but Diem wasn't looking for popularity. He knew that his base of support was minuscule, that he would have trouble with the majority of the population who had been supporting the Viet Minh in the long war against the French. So force was the only way he could effectively ready his people for the "Democratic alternative." His authoritarian tactics were not widely reported in the American press until eight years later, when he fell from favor.

Diem's strong-man rule in South Vietnam gave the United States two policy choices. It could keep the Viet Minh from power, block the scheduled 1956 national elections, prevent unification of the country, hang on and trust for the best. Or it could follow the new French policy of flexibility in a hopeless situation, allow the elections, learn to live with an unquestionably greater Communist influence in Vietnam, and accept the necessary parallel of a lessening of Western power there.

There were arguments for both positions within the Eisenhower Administration. Helpful in pushing the United States into a "hard line" of support for the

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authoritarian Diem was an unusual array of visitors to Saigon in the early days of the new premier's rule.

Cardinal Spellman, who told an American Legion Convention that the Geneva agreements meant "taps" for freedom in Southeast Asia, flew to Vietnam to hand-deliver the first check of Catholic Relief Agency aid. Wesley Fishel, the Michigan State University professor, took up residence in the Presidential Palace and became one of Diem's chief advisors. Also bedding down in the palace was Wolf Ladejinsky, a New Dealer who had stayed on in the Agriculture Department only to be plowed under in the McCarthy period. Diem hired Ladejinsky to study land reform, which convinced many American liberals that Diem was serious about social reforms. (These reforms proved later to be not only inefficient but laughable. Diem tried to restore the colonial property balance by returning to absentee landlords land that the bewildered peasants thought they owned—land the Communists had given them during the revolutionary period.)

Another important visitor to Diem was Leo Cherne, the President of the International Rescue Committee. Founded to help refugees from Germany in the Hitler period, the Committee turned during the Cold War to aiding refugees from Communist countries. Cherne spent two and a half weeks in Vietnam and came away convinced that Diem had great potential as an anti-Communist leader. He then sent his assistant, Joseph Buttinger, to set up a Vietnam operation for the Committee. There Buttinger met Colonel (now General) Edward Lansdale, the CIA's Man in Saigon, hero of Eugene Burdick's *The Ugly American* and villain of Grahame Greene's *The Quiet American*. Landsdale, a gregarious former San Francisco advertising man who believes in "selling" the American way abroad, is given sole credit in the recent book on the CIA, *The Invisible Government*, for the United States support of Diem. That is not quite fair. It ignores the hard work of Cardinal Spellman and Buttinger. It was the unlikely triumvirate of the CIA man, the Cardinal and Buttinger, an ex-Austrian Socialist leader, that was responsible for forming United States policy behind Diem.

Landsdale went through channels. He convinced CIA Director Allen Dulles of Diem's worth. Dulles talked to his brother, the Secretary of State. And John Foster Dulles brought the word to Eisenhower.

Spellman's influence was important in certifying Diem as a solid anti-Communist, no small thing in the McCarthy era.

Buttinger made the contacts in the ex-radical and the liberal circles which were to eventually support the consensus of the "Vietnam Lobby" for the next six years.

Buttinger's background is important in understanding the eagerness with which he accepted Diem as the "alternative." A disillusioned Socialist, Buttinger saw in the stocky, five-foot-five premier the nationalist answer to communism that he had himself attempted to provide as an Austrian Socialist leader in the 1930s. Buttinger was then one Gustav Richter, the provincial youth leader of the Social-Democratic party which had been forced underground by the waves of victorious Fascism. Buttinger fought back, but it was an embittering experience. His one accomplishment, he relates in his memoirs, *In The Twilight of Socialism*, was to halt the spread of the Communists. But just when Buttinger had reorganized his party, the Nazis goose-stepped in. He fled to Paris and then to New York, and in flight the certainty of his world of Socialist politics vanished, and so did his ideology. Buttinger did not join the Socialist Party in America, though in a continuing search for new ideas to replace his fallen Marxist certainty he dabbled in Socialist politics as an editor of *Dissent* magazine.

He took to Diem with the enthusiasm that can only be mustered by an ex-radical who, once again, has something to believe in. He had been in Vietnam only four days when, at Landsdale's request, he met Diem. He was to meet with him frequently during the ensuing three months. Lansdale took Buttinger under his wing and introduced him to the top security people in Diem's government and the Vietnamese Army. This convinced Buttinger that Diem had the strength to remain in power, if only the United States would give him complete support.

Before Buttinger left for the United States in December, 1954, he had several five and six hour conversations with Diem. He returned a man with a mission: to settle for nothing less than a total commitment to Diem by the United States.

With the aid of Lansdale and Cardinal Spellman, he succeeded, and the "Vietnam Lobby" was born.

THE "VIETNAM LOBBY" was an unusual alliance of ex-left intellectuals, conservative generals and liberal politicians. Its primary goal was to convince the public that "free Vietnam" was accomplishing miracles and could withstand the Red onslaught if the United States would continue its support. One year after Buttinger's return from Vietnam, in the fall of 1955, the "lobby" achieved a measure of formal organization with the establishment of the American Friends of Vietnam. The Friends, for the next six years, were in the forefront of the fight to maintain Diem's regime as a "showcase of democracy."

Like all such organizations, the American Friends of

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Vietnam had a letterhead with a string of impressive names running in small print down the side. But the Friends' list was unusual because it was virtually a roll call of the liberal center: Senators John F. Kennedy and Richard Neuberger, intellectuals Max Lerner and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Representatives Emmanuel Celler and Edna Kelly, diplomat Angier Biddle Duke. For balance, there was Socialist Norman Thomas (who has since changed his position radically) and ultra-conservative J. Bracken Lee. Two famous generals, "Wild Bill" Donovan and "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, were co-chairmen.

The Friends was run by its 14-member executive committee. An analysis of the committee reveals a curious relationship between the Friends, the International Rescue Committee, and a New York fund raiser and public relations man named Harold Oram. The relationship is extraordinary because the executive committee of the International Rescue Committee, the executive committee of the American Friends of Vietnam, and Harold Oram's executive personnel were all pretty much the same people.

It was Oram, then public relations man for the International Rescue Committee and a former promoter of '30s leftist causes, who later became associated with anti-Communist and liberal center groups, whom Buttinger first approached for help when he returned from Vietnam in late 1954. Oram arranged through a friend at the Catholic Relief Agency in Washington for Buttinger to meet with Cardinal Spellman.

Two months before the organization of the American Friends of Vietnam was announced, Oram's public relations firm signed a contract to represent the Vietnamese government for $3,000 a month plus expenses. They stayed on the job until 1961. Oram was a member of the executive committee of the American Friends of Vietnam. So was Elliot Newcomb, his partner at the time the contract was signed with the Diem regime. Newcomb left the firm a year later, but remained on the executive committee and was subsequently treasurer. The Executive Secretary, and later Corporation Secretary and Assistant Treasurer of the American Friends of Vietnam, was a young man named Gilbert Jonas—Oram's account executive and "campaign director" on the Vietnam account. Oram and Jonas were registered as foreign agents acting for the Republic of Vietnam during the same period they held key executive positions on the Friends, a seemingly independent committee dedicated to the blameless purpose of working "to extend more broadly a mutual understanding of Vietnamese and American history, cultural customs and democratic institutions."

The interlocking directorates of the International Rescue Committee and the Friends was more to be expected than the strange connection between the Republic of Vietnam and the Friends of Vietnam. Nine of the fourteen directors of the Friends were also members of the Board of Directors of the International Rescue Committee, or were its employees. Both Leo Cherne and Joseph Buttinger were on the Friends' board. Cardinal Spellman was represented by Msgr. Hartnett, a key official of the Catholic Relief Agency. Two writers for *The New Leader*, Norbert Muhlen and Sol Sanders, were also on the executive committee of the Friends. The anti-communism and quest for social reform that characterized *The New Leader* was typical of the philosophies of men on these two groups: New Deal liberals like Leo Cherne and ex-radicals like Buttinger, Oram and Jonas. Jonas later became public affairs director of the International Rescue Committee, and served on Kennedy's presidential campaign staff in 1960 as an advisor on minority group problems.

Oram earned his $3,000 a month. Diem was not always an easy man to keep popular. His consolidation of power in Vietnam had authoritarian overtones, and his off-the-cuff remarks were often blatantly undemocratic. The first task of the "Vietnam Lobby" was to package Diem as a commodity palatable to the American public. The packaging operation assumed grand scale proportions during Diem's triumphal "official visit" to the United States in 1957. Diem landed aboard President Eisenhower's personal plane, addressed a joint session of Congress, then took off for New York and breakfast with Cardinal Spellman. Mayor Wagner hailed him as the man "to whom freedom is the very breath of life itself." At a dinner jointly sponsored by the International Rescue Committee and the American Friends of Vietnam, Angier Biddle Duke presented Diem with the Admiral Richard E. Byrd Award for "inspired leadership in the cause of the free world."

Diem's American advisors took care that his speeches were liberally salted with democratic clichés. Many of Diem's speeches were written by Buttinger, others by Sol Sanders. Sanders, a Friends' director who was writing articles on Southeast Asia for *The New Leader*, had been close to Diem when the Vietnamese leader was in exile in America during the early 1950s. They enjoyed a poignant reunion, recalling those more difficult times when both were low on funds and Diem would come into New York by train from the Maryknoll seminary in Ossining and have tea with Sanders in a Greenwich Village cafe. (Sanders, now an Asia correspondent for *U. S. News and World Report*, was one of Diem's few friends who remained loyal to the end—even when he fell from U. S. favor. To Sanders' credit, he resigned from the American Friends of Vietnam when the executive committee fired off a congratulatory telegram to the generals who had deposed and murdered Diem. The telegram arrived while Diem's body was still, literally, warm.) But in 1957 Diem was the certified President of South Vietnam, and during three years in office had managed to crush rival religious sects and independent

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politicians and surround himself with a court of American advisors—Michigan State University professors, military advisors, A.I.D. officials, Catholic Welfare aides.

Diem, however, had achieved little else in three years in office. But during his visit to America the "lobby" promoted the "miracle" myth. Everything that Diem did, or attempted, was described as a miracle. Articles appeared in magazines, from *The Reporter* to *Look*, hailing the "miracles" of political stability, land reform, refugee settlement and economic development allegedly achieved by the Diem regime. But the "miracle" was actually only a miracle of public relations.

The "Vietnam Lobby" also perpetuated a second myth—that free elections for all Vietnam, which would include the Communists, and called for in the Geneva agreements, were simply a means of enslaving the free people of Vietnam. Since the Communist-backed Viet Minh would almost certainly win, because they had "duped" the populace, the United States was actually striking a blow for freedom by keeping the people of Vietnam from holding a national election. We were "saving" them from themselves, and at the same time teaching them the golden way of American democracy through Diem's "showcase" government. This type of rationale Kipling used to write poems about.

In many ways the most important of the myths promoted by the "Vietnam Lobby" was the refugee myth. The dramatic story of one million refugees fleeing to the south from the Communist north supported the theory of the North Vietnam leaders as "devils" and Diem's regime as the sanctuary of freedom. Naive, well-meaning publicists like Dr. Tom Dooley projected this view with extraordinary success in the United States (*Ramparts*, January 1965). What Americans were not told was that the refugees were almost all Catholics, many of whom had fought with the French against the Communist Viet Minh, and who realized they could get better treatment under the Catholic Diem. These refugees were settled and well cared for through extensive American aid, becoming a privileged minority in South Vietnam. But Diem had to use repressive police measures to keep in line the remainder of the population (13 million) which did not share the Catholics' visceral hatred of Communism, and in fact were sympathetic toward the Viet Minh. It took an equally dramatic event—the protest of self-immolation by a Bhuddist monk—to center attention on Diem's preferential treatment of the Catholic minority.

The "lobby" had a myth for almost every occasion. When things began to go badly for Diem in 1961, the Kennedy Administration rationalized the radical increase in this nation's military involvement in Vietnam by adhering to the myth that aggression by the Communists had wrecked Diem's progressive programs, and even forced him to adopt some totalitarian means—temporarily, because of the crisis, of course. So persuasive and pervasive were the myths postulated by the "Vietnam Lobby" that few people were willing to believe that the source of the trouble might lie with Diem himself.

THE CROWD in Madison Square Garden was dressed like it was a coming out party instead of a political rally. But the tweeds and swept-back coiffures were proper because the Young Americans for Freedom's big "Tshombe Freedom Rally" in October of 1962 was something of a coronation ceremony: the right wing college group was presenting awards to its heroes. John Wayne got an award. So did John Dos Passos and Strom Thurmond. And so did Marvin Liebman.

Marvin Liebman is a 41-year-old ex-Communist-turned-publicist for right wing causes—apparently a good publicist, judging from the way the YAF chose to honor him. Liebman provides an interesting link between the activities of the two great Cold War pressure groups: the China Lobby and the "Vietnam Lobby." A late-blooming member of the China Lobby, Liebman quit the Communist party in 1945 but it was not until 1957, while working with the International Rescue Committee, that his politics took a sharp curve to the right. Liebman, working for Harold Oram's public relations firm (his name appeared on Oram's stationery alongside that of Gilbert Jonas during the middle '50s), was instrumental in setting up the Committee of One Million Against The Admission of Communist China to the U.N.

Liebman became a sort of right wing establishment man. He was Secretary of the Committee of One Million, an advisor to the Young Americans for Freedom, a collaborator with *National Review* editor William F. Buckley Jr. in setting up the Committee for Freedom of All Peoples—which was outdone in its protest over Krushchev's visit to the United States only by the *National Review's* black-bordered cover.

The China Lobby, like the "Vietnam Lobby," fused liberal and right wing elements in the impassioned promotion of an anti-Communist leader (for Diem, read Chiang Kai-shek), whose prime and perhaps sole qualification for leadership was his anti-communism. Ross Y.

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

The New Leader (1959)

Koen, in his book *The China Lobby in American Politics* (remarkably unavailable since shortly after its 1960 publication), names among the prime outlets for pro-Chiang propaganda, *Life*, *The Reader's Digest*—and *The New Leader*.

The New Leader's role in the China Lobby became a cause celebre in 1963 when Senator William Fulbright's Foreign Relations Committee released testimony stating that Chiang Kai-shek's New York publicity firm had paid *The New Leader* $3000, in 1958, to publish a pro-Chiang article. There are two conflicting accounts. One was given to Senator Fulbright's Committee by Mr. Hamilton Wright Jr., a principal in the publicity firm then working for Chiang.

"...as I recall, they (*New Leader* editors) approached me and said, 'Look, you are representing the Republic of China. We have this wonderful article that has been written, and we are going to put this out as a special supplement. Now, it is going to go; you know our circulation is to the intellectual group and, gee, we just don't have enough money to get this into print all the way. We can certainly use a contribution.'"*

The other version is *The New Leader's*. It is even more interesting because it blames the whole thing on Marvin Liebman. S. M. Levitas, *The New Leader's* longtime editor and a bitter anti-Communist out of the East European Socialist tradition, died in 1961. The magazine's new editor, Myron Kolatch, wrote Fulbright and said that a check of the files revealed no such pay-off. Kolatch said that the $3000 came to *The New Leader* from the American-Asia Education Exchange in connection with an article "Communist China: Power and Prospects," by Dr. Richard L. Walker. The article was to appear in a special issue of the magazine and Levitas asked the Exchange to purchase 10,000 reprints for $3000 to help finance the issue. Levitas was a mem-

** Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States, Part 7, Page 725 Government Printing Office Washington 1963.*

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ber of the Exchange. The author, Dr. Walker, was on its Board of Directors and Marvin Liebman, whom the New York Times described as "a publicist connected with Nationalist Chinese causes," was the Secretary-Treasurer. The Exchange, in fact, operated out of Liebman's publicity office. Kolatch said that he subsequently learned that the Exchange got the $3000 from Liebman who got it, in turn, from Chiang's publicity firm. *The New Leader*, Kolatch said, had not been aware that the funds originated in the Nationalist China camp.

The China-Lobby/"Vietnam Lobby" syndrome came full circle in the Spring of 1964 when Liebman was revealed as the promoter of an advertisement in the Washington Star, signed by the parents of American soldiers killed in Vietnam, which called for an extension of the war.

The New Leader, in recent years, has lost much of the blind anti-communism which allowed it to accept too readily the positions of the China Lobby and the "Vietnam Lobby," according to author Paul Jacobs:

> "*The New Leader* today is much different than it was under Levitas. For Levitas, the primary role of the magazine was fighting the Communists and very often he subordinated all else to it. Considering the bitter experience the non-Communist left had with the Communists, Levitas' position was understandable. But the tragedy was that it led not only to an obsession but to an inability to accept the fact that changes were taking place inside the Communist world. Today *The New Leader* does have a better understanding of the problems the world faces and an article is no longer measured only by how anti-Communist it may be."

But *The New Leader* school of anti-communism—shared in the '50s by *The Reporter* and other liberal publications and such groups as the International Rescue Committee and the Congress for Cultural Freedom—is important because it helped to shape the Cold War as we live it today. When World War II ended, the State Department and the Pentagon had to formulate policies for a world where the Communists were now the enemy—but where splinter Socialist movements, both "democratic" and "undemocratic," were emerging all over Europe and Asia. It was obvious that we couldn't be against *everybody*. Instrumental in helping decide where to draw the line was the circle of ex-radicals and disillusioned intellectuals, and social democrats such as Levitas, whose principled anti-communism dated from the creation of the Third International. Where a State Department career man might be insensitive to the crimes of the Third International against the intellectuals, old Bolsheviks and the Jews, a former East European Socialist like Levitas could speak with passion about who were the good guys and who were the bad guys—and which side the United States should support in the name of anti-communism.

The same liberals who backed Diem fought Senator Joseph McCarthy, but they fought McCarthy on his own battleground of anti-communism. This was the only ground acceptable in the hate climate of the '50s and the anti-communism of the ex-radical turned "liberal" had paramount influence in the hard line of America's post-war politics.

The "Vietnam Lobby" was the ultimate product of this school of liberal Cold War anti-communism. Unlike the businessmen, missionaries and military politicians that joined the China Lobby for self-seeking reasons, the members of the "Vietnam Lobby" were True Believers. They were on a Crusade for Democracy. Looking at the world through anti-Red glasses, they convinced themselves that a Diem could be a Democrat. They had trouble convincing Eisenhower, so they pressured his administration into line. Then they set out to convince the country. They succeeded, and the myths that they created—that we were "asked" to step in by the Vietnamese people, that we are protecting "democracy" by blocking elections—remain long after Diem to haunt the State Department White Paper, and President Johnson's speeches.

Senator Fulbright, in a recent speech on ideology and foreign policy, cited a thought of William Makepeace Thackeray that applies with extraordinary precision to the "Vietnam Lobby": "The wicked are wicked, no doubt," wrote Thackeray, "and they go astray and they fall, and they come by their deserts; but who can tell the mischief which the very virtuous do?"

RAMPARTS' *Robert Scheer recently completed an 18-month survey of Vietnam for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. The foregoing article is based largely upon his findings, set forth in full in a forthcoming Center publication.*

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Four views on Southeast Asia

1.

A VIEW FROM PHNOM PENH

by
Robert Scheer

THE MISSIONARY SPIRIT requires for its sustenance a stereotyped view of those who are to be saved and a horrific view of the devil who tempts them. Otherwise complex and individual personalities are reduced to so many 'souls.' So it is with great national powers bent on saving smaller ones from the forces that would bedevil them.

It is for this reason that we have been given the 'domino theory' which is the basis of United States policy in Southeast Asia. This theory quite simply reduces a hodgepodge of peoples, each possessing its own lengthy, confused and emotionally charged history and cultural patterns, into so many abstract names – neat black dominoes all ready to fall.

The thesis is a simple one. The devil is China, obsessed with a desire to conquer the free and independent nations of Southeast Asia. The Chinese have created a pattern of successful subversion first in North Vietnam and now South Vietnam. If they are allowed to attain victory there it will create a momentum that will cause all of Southeast Asia to fall.

In the United States or in Western circles abroad this seems a plausible thesis. But outside of that rarified atmosphere it soon becomes obvious that the theory doesn't hold. The simple priorities and concerns of the Cold War are not those of Asian leaders or of the masses. And our pictures of Asian reality are quite frequently ludicrous. There are hates and fears and desires among these people that are quite removed from ours – and which we have not begun to understand.

For example, Sukarno's 'Go-to-hell-with-your-aid' Indonesia, while moving closer to China's foreign policy, is at the same time determined to reduce the hold that Indonesia's three percent Chinese minority has on the country's economy. As in all Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese are the power elite of Indonesian business and commerce. Sukarno, for all his militant pan-Asian sentiments, wants to keep the Chinese in line. One of Indonesia's fears about Malaysia is that the 42 percent of Malasians who are Chinese will come eventually to control Indonesian commerce.

We have helped create such immense barriers to understanding our 'enemy' that it is often impossible for even the well intentioned and dedicated observer to increase his understanding. We have come to accept the fact that Americans are not allowed to travel to the Communist countries of Asia but there is now a growing list of non-Communist countries that chose to deny us access. It is impossible for any American to obtain a visa to Burma. American newspaper reporters are now generally denied access to Cambodia and Indonesia. There is a whole world in Asia that affects us more and more decisively as we know less and less about it. This ignorance of this other world allows Americans to hold to the most fantastic notions concerning it. There is in fact no proposition that one can utter about the Communists of Asia, no matter how fantastic – e.g., they use babies for fertilizer – that does not seem plausible.

ROBERT SCHEER, *a* RAMPARTS *staff writer, recently returned from a two-month tour of Southeast Asia.*

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For there are no observers to challenge it; there is no traffic of ideas.

During February and March of this year Western observers were offered a rare opportunity to enter this other world. The Cambodian government sponsored the first Conference of Indochinese People in the capital city of Phnom Penh, and some American reporters (at first I was alone, then we grew to five) were granted visas to visit Cambodia for the Conference.

The Conference included a wide spectrum of political, social and ethnic groups. Delegates from North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) had to contend with Vietnamese neutralists who were as haunted by the spectre of communism as they were by American imperialism. Everyone listened politely as the dozens of ethnic groups explained their own very special problems, the religious sects going into the most detailed description of the harassment they have received over the centuries. The Conference even broadened its concept of Indochina to include all those peoples found between India and China and received President Sukarno of Indonesia for a four-day visit. And on the last day a mass rally, presided over by the Vice-President of the NLF and Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, seemed agreed that Ho Chi Minh, Charles De Gaulle and Fidel Castro were the three great men of this era.

WHILE ALL THIS WAS IN PROGRESS, everyone, delegates and observers alike, were conscious of the distant and repetitive sound of American bombs falling on North Vietnam. (We couldn't really hear the sound of bombs but it seemed that way as one listened to the speeches and read the dispatches in the local press.) Some people showed hatred for the few of us among the correspondents who were American. The Vice-President of the NLF banned us from his press conference, a rather fat French ex-colonial snarled over cocktails at me, "Vous êtes un assassin," and Sukarno, during his speeches, would pick out the American types in the audience to broil with fiery and derogatory phrases. Finally after some frigid conversation with Chinese newsmen and a few trips to their embassy, I realized that we are each of us held responsible for America, regardless of our personal politics. It is difficult to exaggerate the gap between our worlds.

Sitting at the conference, often half-bored and non-comprehending amidst robed Buddhists, dark Austriennes, Northern Catholics, Chams, Islamic Khmers, Caodaiste Vietnamese, Neutralist Laotians and Royalist Cambodians, it seemed that there has never been an arrogance quite as great as that of us Americans. We not only presume to control events in this part of the world but must also impose a political ideology – a concept of freedom no less – on its people. It is cruel enough to push people around for their gold and ivory but it is perverse and emasculating to dictate their history and believe that it is done in their interest. The best description of it is still provided by Graham Greene's "Quiet American" in Vietnam who is busily making plastic bicycle-pump bombs to help the Cao Dai generals vanquish the Hoa Hao Chieftains so that Democracy will reign supreme.

During a lull in the Conference I went to Angkor, the site of the high point of the magnificant Khmer civiliza-

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tion some ten thousand years ago. There I met an American foreign service officer up from our embassy in Saigon. He was a genial and interesting fellow and as we wandered through the ruins of Angkor for several hours, inspecting the intricate architecture and sensitive sculpture, he calmly explained to me that we might soon have to bomb Hanoi as part of our effort not to escalate the war. He wanted to be sure to "take in" the ruins before the war spread to Cambodia. He explained to me just how the Chinese Communists would sweep down through Cambodia the minute the United States withdrew from South Vietnam. If not the Chinese, then the Viet Cong would take it over within three months. It was necessary to protect the Cambodians from this fate, despite their feelings to the contrary, because they were a simple people who did not understand the nature of modern communism. He particularly understood this menace because he had read a book on communism by a man named Brezhinsky, which he strongly recommended to me. His favorite line was that it would be 'irresponsible' of us to abandon these people to their naiveté. At first I thought he was putting me on – saying all this in the midst of the ruins of an empire that had to be moved every few centuries because of successive invasions of neighboring peoples and about the modern Cambodians who are perhaps the most sensitive observers of the intricacies of Asian politics. But after hours of this conversation, spun out in the dullest and most sincere fashion, I began to understand with horror that those Jules Feiffer cartoons do make up our most accurate history.

After this encounter I returned to Phnom Penh with great sympathy for the position of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, who is potentially the most tragic figure here. For it is he who is caught in the midst of this nightmare and not the leaders of the Viet Cong. After 20 years of fighting, the Viet Cong no longer have illusions about the nature of the enemy. They seem to almost accept the conditions of war as the only coherent view of life. There is probably no other way to survive when one has spent his infancy, adolescence and now his adulthood fighting for what he believed all along was his birthright. These are the "Just Men"– noble, proud, defiant, idealistic, spiteful, and extremely petty and jealous of their prerogatives. One cannot help but hope they win; few have so earned their chance at history. But one can hardly expect that such a victory will produce a lovely or generous society. The soil has been too hard too long.

But the Cambodians have escaped all this and they do have another vision of life. Their fortune is due not only to the suffering of the Viet Minh and Viet Cong but also to the skill and diligence of their leader Prince Sihanouk. It was the Viet Minh victory over the French that forced the dissolution of the French hold on Indochina and gave Cambodia its independence, and it is Prince Sihanouk who has kept that independence from being mangled by America's obsessions during the Cold War.

If one is to understand the current international position of Cambodia he must first realize the enormity of the United States' failure there during the past ten years. Back in the winter of '55 and '54, when the first phase of the Indo-China war was drawing to a close, the Cambodian government of Prince Sihanouk was solidly allied on the side of the 'free world' and Cambodian troops had fought under French command against the Viet Minh. During the Geneva conference the Viet Minh wanted the rebels who had fought against Sihanouk to represent Cambodia.

The United States helped the Cambodians to gain independence but it did so because of the requirements of Cold War politics. As the Prince recalls his conversation with John Foster Dulles in 1953, the latter said, "I promise you to force the French to give you independence in order for us together to vanquish the Viet Minh, that is to say, communism." Dulles insisted that the French army remain or "you will be instantly devoured by the Communists." But at that point Cambodian nationalism required French withdrawal. It has been ten years now and Cambodia still has not been devoured. This United States' obsession with Communist expansion and Cold War politics troubled the Cambodians even then, but it was only during the next ten years that they realized how totally divorced the United States' perspective was from Asian reality.

In the simplest sense it went contrary to the known facts. As the Prince has written: "At the Geneva conference we were opposed to the Communist powers because they, with the Viet Minh, wanted to divide our country . . . since the Geneva conference all of the Communist countries, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have respected our sovereignty and our frontiers. The allies of the 'free world' on the contrary, have attacked and menaced our independence and territorial integrity." This last is a reference to the border incursions of the Thai and Vietnamese Armies which the United States has built up to several hundred thousand strong – as compared with 29,000 Cambodian troops. Both of these countries have traditionally represented a much greater threat to Cambodia than China. Units of the Vietnamese Army, accompanied by American advisers, have frequently crossed over into Cambodia and fought on Cambodian soil in their pursuit of the Viet Cong. United States' planes have 'accidently' sprayed Cambodian fields with insecticides as they sought to deny food and shelter to the Communists. It is this sort of blundering incomprehension on the part of the United States that alarms the Cambodians. But most frightening of all is the United States' view of China.

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In one of his writings the Prince recalls another conversation with Dulles in which the latter expounded on the 'unpopularity' of the Chinese regime and his expectancy that the Chinese people would soon rise up against Mao. In recounting this anecdote the Prince added:

"The aides of the American Minister agreed with respect and conviction. My friend, Ambassador Nong Kimny, looked at them with visible bewilderment. I was able, however, to manage a polite smile."

The Cambodians know the Chinese as well as do any outsiders for there has been a good deal of contact in recent years. But their concerns are not ours and their comprehension of modern China is vastly different.

In an important statement in 1963, Prince Sihanouk systematically took apart the argument that the Chinese Communists have been an aggressive military power in Asia. He further presented the rather novel idea that the viability of Chinese Communist institutions be judged in terms of the needs and history of China.

"In order to realize that a comparison between the life of a Chinese peasant on his people's commune and that of a Khmer (Cambodian) peasant on his vast lands is nonsense, it is necessary to know that, prior to the institution of the new regime by Mao, the people of China were without any doubt the most miserable of the world."

"The Westerners have always had the weakness — or the vanity — to believe that 'their' democracy is the only means of answering the aspirations of the people. This is not a criticism, on the contrary, I sincerely admire the British or American democracy . . . in Great Britain or in the U.S.A."

The Prince does have his own fears of communism. Cambodia is an underpopulated and lush country that neither needs nor wants the sort of militant committment to rapid development and national order that has come to be associated with communism. It is, amazingly enough, a rather happy kingdom, very effectively and undramatically modernizing itself. The Prince is aware of the currents running through Asia which have given the Communists great appeal as the champions of anti-imperialism — an appeal which extends to Cambodia — but his view of Communist expansion is totally different than that of the State Department.

The United States government bases its view of communism (its containment policy) on the case of Soviet Russia's expansion through Eastern Europe following World War II. This was accomplished either through direct military occupation or quite obvious infiltration and civil war. It was above all communism opposed to existing nationalist sentiments. Now whether the State Department wants to believe it or not, communism in Asia has been a very different phenomenon. The Chinese Communists have worked very effectively with existing Asian nationalist movements. That is why they now enjoy excellent relations with the most virulent and independent nationalists. The exception often thought of, Tibet, is seen, rightly or wrongly, by Chinese everywhere as an internal affair affecting one of the traditional provinces of China. As to the dispute with India it is by now clear that the Chinese were in at least as "correct" a position as the Indians. It is simply wrong to take the war in Vietnam as another instance of Chinese aggression. The Vietnamese Communists have been at it as long as the Chinese and actually managed to attain power (1945) before their Chinese counterparts.

MANY NATIONALISTS IN ASIA, including those in Cambodia, are worried about Communist expansion, not through military power or subversion, but rather as an ideal that has greater attractiveness than the charisma or program of the individual national leaders. The irony is that this ideal has become infinitely more attractive as a result of a United States policy which has made of the Communists the central fighters against imperialism and for nationalism. There seems little doubt that Sukarno was brought to the conference in Cambodia to demonstrate that one could be a strong nationalist even if not a Communist. But it is this tendency that Prince Sihanouk fears. In his opening speech to the conference he stated it in the most candid terms:

"The American armaments have not restrained, much less driven back by one millimeter, the progress of communism from which the U.S. pretends to preserve the people of South Vietnam and Laos. On the contrary, the Americans have succeeded in attaining what the Socialist powers themselves would have difficulty in doing: to know how in a few years to cast most of the population of South Vietnam and Laos into the arms of communism, whereas the normal conditions of life of the inhabitants of the prosperous Cochinchine and the religious and monarchistic convictions of the Laotians were scarcely predisposed to Marxism."

It is out of this concern with communism as an ideal, made more attractive by the American 'presence,' that the Prince so desperately desires peace and the withdrawal of the Americans. But he knows that American cooperation is necessary to the establishment of peace. He also has a sufficient understanding of American irrationality not to permit himself that hysterical anti-Americanism so common in Asia. His concern is that the United States will cause an extension of the war that will spell the end of Cambodia and perhaps non-Communist nationalism in Asia as well.

In his address to the conference he stated that it was true that if America was foolish enough to attack China with her 700 million people she would prove indeed to be a paper tiger — *for China*. But for the small

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

countries of Indochina, "*l'impérialisme U.S. reste un tigre très réel.*"

Sihanouk planned this conference last fall with the hope of producing agreement among the participants on a solution to the war that would ultimately be acceptable to the Americans. In his scheduled opening remarks he tried to introduce this "constructive spirit." He pointed out that the most important thing was to convince the unconvinced – the people of the West – "beginning with the people of the U.S.A." He explained just how difficult this would be because the United States "profoundly wounded in her self-respect and her pride" was capable of pursuing the most dangerous course. To the Americans so concerned with "saving face" he offered the example of France. As a result of De Gaulle's policy of withdrawal from the colonies and subsequent support of their independence, the prestige and popularity of France in the underdeveloped world "has never been so great." De Gaulle himself was presented to the delegates as "the greatest Chief of State of the 'free' world and the only western leader worthy of the name." The Prince asked for a reasonable style in the wording of resolutions, "calm and moderate without hatred nor passion."

His program for the peace involved a reconvening of the Geneva conference which would work out the means of foreign withdrawal and the reunification of Vietnam by popular and democratic consultation. The most controversial point was his suggestion "for authentic neutralization of South Vietnam at least until the time of popular consultation towards unification of the country."

Over the past years proposals very much like these have been offered by the National Liberation Front and the main obstacle was the refusal of the United States and England to permit a reconvening of the Geneva conference. But now there was a new difficulty: the N.L.F. had changed its position and it too was opposed to any negotiations at this time.

It was clear from the beginning of the conference that Prince Sihanouk's proposals would not be adopted into the final resolutions. When the conference formally opened, Sihanouk merely made some welcoming remarks and contented himself with distributing among the delegates and the press, printed copies of his scheduled remarks, rather than delivering them orally. He said that he wanted his address distributed "for history," so that the record would show that a peace proposal did exist. In another time it might have been accepted and ultimately will have to be if peace is to return to Indochina.

The NLF and the North Vietnamese delegations had become intransigent. They maintained throughout the conference that total United States withdrawal from South Vietnam was a prior condition for any negotiations. The Pathet Lao on the otherhand, did accept the Prince's proposals for a reconvened Geneva conference on Laos.

But why the NLF obstinancy and change in position? The answer has to be the United States bombing of North Vietnam. Prior to the start of the bombing the NLF had continuously called for a new Geneva conference. Immediately following the bombing in January, their leaders in an interview in the French Communist paper, *Humanité*, withdrew the offer. In private conversations the North Vietnamese delegates

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and those from the NLF expressed the view that to go publicly on record at this time for a negotiated peace would be – to use a few old American expressions – "talking with a gun at your head" and "appeasement." The NLF states publicly now that it is quite willing to go on fighting for another 20 years if that is what is necessary to force the Americans out. Perhaps this is partly a bluff, although the Prince thinks otherwise. But what is certain is that neither the NLF nor the North Vietnamese will ever give in to the bombing. To do so would violate not only the essentially obstinate, idealistic and perverse spirit of the Vietnamese themselves, but also the heart of Asian nationalism. American planes and their bombs and rockets are the symbols of 'neo-colonialism' just as the sun helmets and rifle were symbols of the older variety. No one in Asia doubts that the white man has superior fire power but to expect them to kowtow to that superiority seriously misreads the times. It is the almost unanimous opinion among those knowledgeable about this part of the world that the Vietnamese and Chinese are quite prepared to have their countries leveled to the ground and to take up guerrilla fighting once again rather than give in to the American planes.

It is quite certain that before there can be any possibility of negotiations, the United States will have to desist from such raids for at least several months. But getting the NLF to a peace conference is going to be difficult under any circumstances. They can be expected to dig their heels in at the merest threat of negotiation because of their past experience with such techniques and the history of their movement.

THE PEOPLE IN THE NLF have been waging a long hard war for ten years now – despite American insistence to the contrary – with very little support from anyone. They had to fight this war largely because of (as they see it) the treachery of the Geneva conference of 1954 and of the subsequent role of the United States. It is important to recall that these people, including the "hard core" Communists among them, were left behind in the South to fend for themselves after the division of the country in 1954. They were told by their leaders in the North that the elections scheduled in the Accords for 1956 would actually be held and that they should prepare for that day. The day never came since the United States had discovered in Diem a new hope for 'democracy' and used its military and financial power to support him in blocking the elections.

The years that followed were very hard on these ex-resistance fighters who were left to the caprices of the Diem regime. They were rounded up, forced to give public confessions, imprisoned and tortured. In this period (1954–1959) they received no support from the North which was preoccupied with its own problems and contented itself with periodic calls for the United States to live up to the Geneva agreement.

The second stage of fighting started in the South when these same cadres had had enough of Diem's repression, enough of hoping for a peaceful solution, and took up arms. By all indications this was done without the approval of the government in Hanoi. They have since fought almost entirely on their own, painstakingly securing arms and building up combat units with little more than moral support from Hanoi and Peking. They are, therefore, not particularly eager to give all this up at the moment of their greatest military successes – with the Saigon regime tottering – simply because the North is now suffering bombardment and Cambodia fears an extension of the war. Neither are they terribly concerned with world peace for the world has not shown itself to be very concerned with theirs. They would, perhaps, under certain circumstances go to the conference table but they would be very skeptical and suspicious bargainers.

It would be nearly impossible (for as much psychological as political reasons) for them to deal directly with the United States. More importantly the United States would have to give strong indications prior to the holding of a conference that she accepted the fact that her role in Indochina was at an end. This is what the French did prior to the '54 conference. At the moment it does not seem likely that the United States will accept any such arrangement, but one must then ask what is it that the United States wants?

A reading of the American press produces the confidence that there is a great Johnsonian design behind the apparent chaos of our policy in Vietnam. The deliberate sowing of confusion and the contradictory stances have come to be known as the President's manipulative stock in trade. One almost expects, as a matter of faith, that he will pull some grand compromise which will be accepted as a victory by all parties concerned. But travelling in Southeast Asia one realizes how great a distance separates this world from the one President Johnson inhabits. The idea that Southeast Asian politics may be treated as those of a convention of Democrats or of the United States Congress is perhaps the most dangerous of the Cold War years.

The central problem is that the United States has come to rely on attaining a military position of strength as a prior condition for negotiations. This is particularly dangerous when one realizes that the military position of the South Vietnam-United States Army has never been weaker. Our own officials accept the fact that 80 percent of the countryside is in Viet Cong hands, that the South Vietnam Army will not fight and that we may not be able to hold out much longer. The prospects for a position of miltary superiority have never been so dim. This in turn has produced a feeling of desperate frustration among our officials and advisers,

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many of whom have developed a personal obsession with a 'win' policy.

A particularly committed group is the military which has placed so much of its prestige on victory here. They are convinced that this is the new type of war they must learn to win – a view held in isolation from the political history of Vietnam. Then too, Vietnam is the only war they have at the moment and that is why there are 17 American Generals and innumerable Colonels in Saigon. A mere Major has no status at all. It is the place for quick promotions and the establishment of a combat record. An instance of this is offered by the experience of the Special Forces. Originally sent to Vietnam in '61 as actual combat units, they were granted higher pay, more status and quicker promotion than other "advisers" in Vietnam. As a result many of the military careerists occupying desk jobs in Saigon infiltrated the Special Forces and it soon had no taste for fighting and enough influence to avoid it.

For various reasons this obsession of a relatively small group of Americans with victory in Vietnam grows. But given the refusal of the South Vietnamese army to fight (many of the officers have already made their deal with the Viet Cong), the United States reliance on a military posture must find another outlet. And thus we have the business of bombing which if it accomplishes nothing else does allow our personnel in Saigon to feel that they are doing something "dramatic."

We are then at a very dangerous impasse in Vietnam with neither side willing to make the first moves toward negotiations and with the United States moving toward an irreversible extension of the war.

IN THIS IMPASSE it would seem that the proposals offered by Prince Sihanouk offer the only hope of establishing peace. Time is running out for those who do care about world peace, of those using their influence toward the end of allowing countries like Cambodia, France and the Soviet Union to take the initiative in Vietnam. If the United States would drop its insistence on a strong military posture, which is hopeless in any case, and support the idea of a Geneva conference, it would have a good chance of success. A reconvened conference would allow the Soviet Union, France and Cambodia to work out a proposal that could enlist the support of China and England. To date the English have shown no independence at all from the American position but perhaps once they are pushed onto centre stage they will act more responsibly.

In order for a solution to be acceptable to the NLF it must involve a complete end to the American "presence" in Vietnam. But some Western influence could be retained if the United States passes leadership of the Western position to the French. In return, the NLF would likely accept a period of continued division of the country, some appearances of neutralism and participation in a coalition government with some mechanism for elections. It must be expected that the NLF will very likely be the dominant force in South Vietnam. For it to be otherwise would require rewriting the history of the past 20 years. But it would be a serious mistake to think of the NLF as a mere pawn of the North which can ignore the power that various groups in the South, such as the Buddhists and students have amassed. And to cite Prince Sihanouk again, the longer the United States holds on the more likely it is that the government of the South will be a replica of the one in the North.

The main problem now is to convince American policy makers that they are not going to obtain a military position of strength, that if they continue using their airpower over the North it will make negotiations impossible and will ultimately involve them in a ground war in Asia that nobody wants. They must be convinced that the United States has had its day in Southeast Asia, that the programme didn't work and it is now time to retire gracefully. The alternative is to forget what it was that she was originally after and simply pursue an adventuristic policy of military victory. This would very much heighten the danger of communism in Asia rather than lessen it for it would squeeze out the non-Communist nationalists and force Asians to choose between the United States and Asian communism. There is no question but that they would choose the latter.

It is significant that Sukarno chose to come to the conference for he is one who knows something about the political winds of Asia. He came, he said, because "I believe that it may be one of the most significant events in the history of Asia." He said that he wanted to show the world that the "nationalists" of the "New Emerging Nations" were aligned solidly alongside the NLF, the North Vietnamese and China in "our common resistance to American Imperialism."

The French are much more at home in this part of the world than we are and they know that the time of Western leadership is over. As a result they have been invited back in as a guest and the impact of French culture and politics will continue to be important. This can be the role of the United States as well. But if she insists on playing out her hand to the end, out of a spirit of obstinancy or whatever nightmarish vision of China she might have, it will leave a legacy of hate in Asia that will make the English and French experience seem a lovefeast. As one old British colonial officer told me: "The timber's here, all that's needed is for you damn fools to go ahead and light it."

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2. A VIEW FROM THE PRINCE

Exclusive: Interview with Prince Norodom Sihanouk by Ramparts' Robert Scheer

One of the reasons advanced by the Cambodian Royal Government for the rejection of United States aid is that the American foreign-aid program was designed to develop a Capitalist economy. In what ways is a Capitalist economy incompatible with Cambodia's plans for the future?

Our decision to reject United States aid in all its forms must be placed in a general context: repeated aggressions by the South Vietnamese; permanent and insufferable hostility of the South Vietnamese and Thai people, United States allies, who give wide support to our own rebels, the so-called "Free Khmers" of Son Ngoc Thanh and Sam Sary; the fanatic campaign against Cambodia and her regime, of almost all of the American press that speaks of us as "ingrates, pocketing the United States' money while serving Red China," etc. In passing, I would call it to your attention that if Cambodia is not able to offer herself the luxury of a Capitalistic economy (which would put her under the fist of several rich businessmen and foreign powers), she has not on the other hand adopted the Communist system. Private interests still control a large sector, notably in the realm of agriculture and small and medium industry. If they are able to prove their capacities in these areas, the State will not wish to assume any new control. In taking over control of the banks, of the import-export trade and insurance, the government has assured itself of a revenue that the foreigner had in the past counted for his own profit.

What are the overall, long-term domestic objectives of the Royal Cambodian Government, and in what sense are these socialistic?

Khmer Socialism stems neither from Marxism nor from any other foreign doctrine. Inspired by the sentiments of solidarity, love, and compassion for the Buddha, it is linked to our national heritage. Our kings of Angkor have always practiced it. Also, we *never* deem it contradictory to call the movement of the young people of the kingdom, the "Young Royal Socialists of Khmer."

Our objectives are those of every nation that has the desire to rise from an underdeveloped state: to complete the modernization of our country's economic structure, to continue increasing our agricultural production (especially rice, corn, rubber), through a "politique de l'eau" (dams, canals, reservoirs, etc.) and to create new industries and products in order to satisfy, without recourse to unfavorable import arrangements, our essential national needs.

What is the Cambodian view of the United States role in South Vietnam and what solutions does Cambodia offer towards ending this war? Would Your Royal Highness please also comment on the American fear of "losing face" if it permitted a negotiated peace in South Vietnam?

The answer to this very important question may be found in my speech at the opening of the Conference of the Indo-Chinese People. There, I proposed the neutrality of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, by means of complete and simultaneous disengagement of the East and the West in this region, with strict guarantees and feasible international control.

I believe the "negotiated solution" to be always valuable. But the progressive escalation of the war (the American raids of terror on North Vietnam and the countermeasures that the Socialist world will inevitably take) might ruin attempts at compromise. An all-out conflict, that the United States will finally lose without even being able to save face, is what we are risking.

What is the reaction of Your Royal Highness to the United States argument which holds that the nations of Southeast Asia would fall like dominos to Communist rule, in the event of United States withdrawal from South Vietnam?

It is certain that if the United States provokes a major confrontation in this region — which will inevitably end in their humiliating retreat — all the other Asian nations, one after another (beginning with the allies of the United States), will come to know, if not domination, at least a very strong Communist influence.

That is exactly what I have tried to avoid by interceding over the years for a true neutrality for Laos and South Vietnam, by suggesting that they form with Cambodia, which is already neutral, a "buffer zone" separating the East and West in this troubled region of Southern Asia.

But, the United States, in Laos, has "played ball" with the extreme right and liquidated the neutralists. In perpetuating the war in South Vietnam, in supporting in Saigon leaders who are universally unpopular, known as her "creatures," the United States has forced the majority of the common people and the majority of the elite of South Vietnam into the arms of the Communists. This is not the way to combat Communism in this region, or in many others. This "anti-Communist" war, by reason of the imperialist character that it forcibly assumes in the eyes of the masses, on the contrary, *favors Communism.*

Could Your Royal Highness comment on the level of understanding of the United States Gov-

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Prince Sihanouk on the President of the NLF (Viet Cong)

Following the Conference of Indochinese People Prince Sihanouk invited those journalists still present in Phnom Penh to his mountain retreat for a very candid press conference. There he revealed the substance of a conversation he had held the preceding evening with Mr. Huynh Tan Phat, Vice President of the National Liberation Front and President of their delegation to the conference. His remarks offer a rare insight into the current attitudes of the NLF leadership within South Vietnam. I was the only American present. The following is a verbatim report of Prince Sihanouk recounting the conversation he held with Huynh Tan Phat.— Robert Scheer.

"What the Viet Cong wants is not a confused situation which would obtain if they negotiated now — like Laos in 1962 — while everything is confused — nothing good will result — the conference in 1962 has done Laos more harm than good — has not been successful for Laos. What the NLF wants, Mr. Phat says, is to clarify the situation in South Vietnam and to kill off all that still believes in the United States — all that still sticks to the United States and when the United States supporters, believers, followers will be wiped out, the situation will be clear and the Viet Cong will of necessity, win. Mr. Phat would like to have a clearer situation, a regroupment — the coming to the resistance of all the nationalists — national union to implement peace and independence in the country.

"I think it would be interesting for you to know that Mr. Phat has added this following judgment about Cambodia. He said that before coming to our country he already had a good idea of our way of life and our situation here. But when he arrived here with his other countrymen from South Vietnam it seems that our conditions of life are much better than they could have imagined. So to use his own words he said Cambodia is a very contagious example for South Vietnam and what South Vietnam wants is to have the same way of life, the same situation as Cambodia. And he revealed that he had held conversations with his countrymen from North Vietnam during the conference and they were in agreement with each other so far as the delay they would have before reaching the reunification of Vietnam. He spoke about 10 or even 20 years before reaching the stage of reunification. So he said that during that time and after winning the war in South Vietnam we should like to be neutral like you Cambodians. To be neutral and to have the same way of life, because our conditions of life are more similar to yours than to the conditions of life in the North of our homeland. And he added — so far as foreign aid is concerned — the future independent state of South Vietnam would like to have the same treatment as Cambodia. That is to say — she would like to receive unconditional aid from every side — from the Socialist camp as well as from the Western camp — from France for instance. So you know, I am giving to you the words of Mr. Phat — I cannot guarantee that the future will be like that but you have to take note of this."

ernment concerning developments in the People's Republic of China?

It concerns a total incomprehension. The People's Republic of China replaces, in the imagination of the United States, the ogres, the wolves-in-sheeps-clothing and other frightening phantoms. Your compatriots understand nothing of Asia. They are afraid of it! They mistrust it! They mistreat it! And they are astonished that they are not loved!

To what extent would United States military withdrawal from South Vietnam — and the effect this action would have on the South Vietnamese and Cambodian frontier issue—contribute to a friendly cooperation between the people of Cambodia and the United States?

It is very certain that when the United States will have put an end, in one way or another, to the war they are waging in South Vietnam and in Laos, we will no longer have any reason to be hostile to her. For our hostility stems from the fact that the United States unconditionally supports the Vietnamese and Thais, not only against the Communists, but also against us, the Cambodians, who are neutralists and nationalists. The Vietnamese and Thais are our two traditional adversaries who have, over the course of centuries, torn apart the Khmer Realm and who would like nothing better than to wipe it off the map, joining their frontiers at the Mekong.

The day when the planes supplied by the United States (and piloted by Americans) no longer bomb our territory, when the American tanks, accompanied by South Vietnamese troops, directed by American advisors, no longer penetrate our frontier villages carrying death—the day when America will have recalled her troops from our Indochina, then our relations will inevitably relax.

How would Your Royal Highness see future relations between the United States and a peaceful and disengaged Asia, once the American military presence has disappeared?

A South Asia peaceful and non-aligned, thanks to the joint understanding of East and West, can not fail to maintain good relations among the Eastern and Western camps — also with the United States. America would no longer be, in our eyes, an imperialistic nation that seeks to impose *her* policy and *her* government upon us, but a great nation from whom we would no longer have anything to fear.

Unfortunately, we are not there yet ■

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3.
A VIEW FROM DJAKARTA

by
William Worthy

"*Among the Western countries . . in the period of* Kapitalismus im Aufsteig, *they had great men such as Disraeli, Bismarck and Gambetta. . . . Now in this age of the Universal Revolution of Man they have nobody. . . . They do not have some 'conceptor' whose voice is worth listening to by all mankind. . . . In the past I called America 'the centre of an idea'. Now I can no longer regard America as the centre of an idea.*"

—from a speech to the nation by President Sukarno, August 17, 1964 (the Indonesian "Fourth of July")

ARNOLD TOYNBEE has said that an affluent nation that has not known real suffering for decades, a well-armed nation that for 100 years has not known war on its own soil, is at a serious disadvantage in trying to understand and work with the driving forces in a revolutionary world.

One two-hour speech of a Sukarno or one "report to the people" by a Sihanouk can provide everyday Americans with the kind of heart-and-soul insights the development of understanding requires. But few will listen, and as the world closes in on the smuggest nation on earth, we remain hopelessly ignorant, hopelessly deaf to the warning thunder, and hopelessly arrogant. Even the concept of revolution is not widely understood in our culture. Most of the handful of Americans capable of understanding fearfully look away from the revolutionary future.

Angrily and mistakenly, our editorial writers have begun hurling the "satellite" charge at non-bloc countries that are now opposing U. S. policies, not passively with non-alignment but vigorously with Sukarno's newly articulated concept of confrontation. However we choose to categorize such nations, it is unrealistic to expect them to accept our self-seeking assessments of American purposes and motivations. The suffering Asian is conditioned to reject the political wares of the affluent white bloc. With the Philippines now beginning to churn politically, and even Pakistan no longer in Washington's hip pocket, the market is shrinking for the *status quo* ideology by which most Americans live. "What have we not gone through?" asked President Sukarno of his 104 million countrymen last summer.

> "*The colonial court, colonial prisons, the* poenale sanctie, *lands of exile, the gallows? We have gone through that! Military Fascism? We have gone through that! Colonial aggression? We have gone through that! Imperialist intervention and subversion? We have gone through that! Counter-revolution? We have gone through that! And in opposing all those evils we have combined brain with brawn, tactics of struggle with the building of strength, legal action with illegal activities, guerrilla warfare with frontal warfare, diplomacy with confrontation. People with such experience behind them, a tempered nation like this, cannot easily be defeated.*"

"*Ampera*," the title of a new Indonesian intellectual journal, means "the message of the suffering of the people." Officials here freely admit that the economy is not in good shape. Inflation and budget priorities for the military in the Malaysia dispute have helped to intensify the prevailing misery. Pragmatically, the constant political necessity of tuning in on the message of popular suffering binds a Sukarno to a Mao, a Nkrumah to a Kim Il Sung, a Nasser to a Ho Chi Minh, a Sihanouk to the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Without exception, these chiefs of state have a dismaying array of domestic problems that demand their undivided attention. But the West fears that such concentration on the people's welfare would hasten the day of full decolonization. In a variety of ways, say the Asians, the United States and its NATO partners are keeping three continents in a state of turmoil. Now from more and more capitals comes the inevitable, unified response (e.g., as summed up editorially in the

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Indonesian Herald, Jan. 8, 1965). "The diplomacy of confrontation has to be transacted on all continents. Neo-colonialism must be resisted and made to fail wherever it threatens national freedom."

Belatedly but clearly, we must try to see where the New Emerging Forces, singly and collectively, are headed. But to gain a sense of the political and economic direction in which they are traveling, it is first necessary to reject *in toto* the contrived propaganda notions that leaders out of favor in Washington are (1) sinister; (2) incompetent and chaotic administrators (Indonesia has been "collapsing" for 15 years, according to segments of the American press, yet people in India are currently dying on the streets of starvation in increasing numbers, but virtually none of this news appears in our press since New Delhi's abandonment of non-alignment); (3) unpopular with their "fear-ridden" peoples; and (4) about to be overthrown.

Having led his fragmented victims of colonialism through the 40 years of unremitting trials, 63-year-old Sukarno belies the calumnies of the Western press, as do many of his counterparts. They have left their mark on every aspect throughout the newly emerging world. These are men of extraordinary personality. To understand the complex countries they rule, we should demand of our newspapers, periodicals and book publishers a maximum of objective information about these men, their writings and speeches. We should ask the television networks for more personal documentaries, free of superfluous editorial dissertations. Looking back at the extraordinary propaganda barrage about Fidel Castro during the first three years of the Cuban revolution, I still wonder why the discerning minority of our reading public – those who remember the lies and contradictions of yesteryear – never rose in wrath at government and mass media when, one by one, the myths and fabrications were quietly withdrawn and discarded.

Kidney troubles did not affect Sukarno's judgment, as one American newspaper speculated in its initial shock at his United Nations walkout. His decision was not "impulsive." The possibility never existed that Washington, London and Moscow could muster enough pressure or sweet talk to induce this political veteran to reverse a decision he fully understood. He did not receive cues or instructions from Peking.

Like Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, "Bung Karno," as he is popularly known inside Indonesia, knows where he wants to go and has firm ideas on how to get there. Art connoisseur, student of history, multilingual, widely traveled, and well informed (he has "read everything," his people tell me), he is clearly guided by a sense of the future so tragically lacking among rootless Americans. In 1930, when we "advanced" Americans thought of "the starving Chinese" within a patronizing missionary framework or in the nonpolitical terms of *The Good Earth*, this 29-year-old East Javanese colonial was telling a Dutch colonial court in the now famous city of Bandung: "The present struggle for power in China has become the lifeblood of the rivalry between the dragons of imperialism. The present struggle for power in China has become the basis of the foreign policies of Japan, America and Britain." A year earlier, the Dutch had thrown him into jail when he declared: "At the end of the world war which is coming, at the end of the Pacific War, at that time Indonesia will become independent." In March, 1933, he persuaded the nationalist movement to reject Dutch offers to elect a few Indonesians to their Parliament. He wrote: "We must pursue a principled policy of non-cooperation, rejecting in principle joining the Volksraad, the States General and the League of Nations."

Eight or nine days before the startling news of Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, President Sukarno addressed a luncheon meeting of the American Men's Association in Djakarta. His non-controversial tone seemed in keeping with a monthly get-together of well-fed Americans residing in a revolutionary capital and dining in the country's most expensive hotel. From the gay and light presidential banter I perceived no foreign policy trends, nor projected any notion of better relations with Washington.

"Among my closest friends are Americans," he told his American audience. "For example, Howard Jones. I love him immensely! Mary Lou. I love her immensely! I hope Howard is not jealous about that. She is the only ambassador's wife whom I kiss publicly, because I love her."

Less than a month earlier, a mile away from that luncheon site, student demonstrators had sacked and burned a United States Information Service library to protest the United States-Belgian airlift at Stanleyville. Simultaneously, the Indonesian people as a whole, leaders included, had expressed strong disapproval of the Congo intervention. On November 10, while President Modibo Keita of Mali was on a state visit to Djakarta, his host publicly attacked the United Nations and the role of the Secretary General in Malaysia's birth. "To hell with U Thant!" he cried, repeating it a second time for the benefit of cue-conscious analysts.

Nevertheless, the American community took heart at the luncheon meeting just before Christmas. Even top-level embassy personnel were "reassured" when Sukarno reiterated his admiration for Thomas Jefferson and Franklin Roosevelt. They chose to forget his direct thrusts at contemporary America in his important annual policy speech on August 17. Thus disarmed, they reacted with dismay on New Year's Day when the same charming head of state pulled his country out of the world organization. "And in that good speech at the luncheon he didn't give even a hint of what was com-

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ing," a surprised and somewhat indignant American remarked to me later.

This sample of Yankee *naiveté* has been widely matched elsewhere during the protracted cold-war period of declining U. S. prestige. Recently a New Yorker who, in the 1950s, worked for USIS in Phnom-Penh reminisced in a letter to this writer: "In Ambassador Strom's day, Prince Sihanouk used to irritate hell out of the Ambassador, and keep everyone alternately hopping and guessing. . . . How they used to stew over whether or not Monseigneur would attend the Fourth of July reception – or whether he would dump this minister or that '*haut functionnaire*' whom the top brass had been busy cultivating with Scotch and flattery! To me it was a kind of never-never-land operation."

Despite great contrasts in size, history and leadership style, Cambodia and Indonesia exemplify neutralist disillusionment with a once admired nation. The small Buddhist kingdom and the sprawling island republic have become leaders in Asian efforts to arrest American policies in South Vietnam, the Congo, Cuba and other colonial conflict areas. "As long as I live," said Prince Norodom Sihanouk on January 8, "I will fight for the disappearance of the despicable American imperialists from the Far East." President Sukarno is forcefully demanding the world-wide elimination of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of all foreign troops. Last November, from the vantage point of North Vietnam, I was able to observe the new closeness between Hanoi and the hitherto non-aligned capitals of Phnom-Penh and Djakarta. Together with China, North Korea and conceivably Burma, they constitute the likely Asian nucleus for a revolutionary United Nations. In December, Chau Seng, a top aide to Prince Sihanouk, told me: "Cambodia, which tries to safeguard its strict neutrality, has leaned toward China only through the fault of the U. S. . . . It is the same process which has pushed Cuba toward the socialist camp."

Revolution, says Sukarno, rejects yesterday. A revolution is a do-it-yourself outfit. A revolution is not a very polite thing. A revolution is forced to recognize a dividing line between friend and foe.

"Yesterday" is easily defined: outside domination in many guises, outside exploitation, outside interference, deliberate stagnation. Thus measured, thus judged, have our postwar policies pointed toward yesterday's colonial enslavement or tomorrow's universal liberation? Three months before the Bay of Pigs invasion, almost four years before the Congo airlift, the *Manchester Guardian* (Jan. 12, 1961) reported the verdict: the worldwide consensus that the U. S. has become "the arch imperialist." At that time the list of countries cited as evidence was considerably shorter than today's list. But the main instrument for implementing the policies regarded as imperialistic or neo-colonialist was then, and still is, the Central Intelligence Agency.

To Asians seeking their freedom and national sovereignty the name "CIA" has, for 18 years, connoted oil, minerals and blind reaction, political assassination, bribed journalists, corrupted rulers, covert arms drops and officially denied air attacks, piratical coastal forays, Uncle Tom diplomacy, coup d'état and fanatical anti-communism.

In *The Invisible Government* (pages 144-145), the authors report that, during Sukarno's 1961 visit to Washington, (President) "Kennedy commented to one of his aides: 'No wonder Sukarno doesn't like us very much. He has to sit down with people who tried to overthrow him.' "

For CIA plots against Sukarno the British base at nearby Singapore is made to order. Whether or not one agrees with the Indonesians that Malaysia is a neo-colonialist project to protect British investments, Djakarta knows that Washington consorts with London in Kuala Lumpur in return for Whitehall's moral support in South Vietnam. Both Tory and Labor spokesmen have publicly acknowledged the back-scratching deal. From other military bases in the North Borneo area of the Malaysian Federation, the British have long been

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infiltrating arms, supplies and agents across the jungle border into Indonesian Borneo. No knowledgeable Indonesian believes that the CIA has remained aloof.

These Western tactics have already backfired. D. N. Aidit, chairman of the powerful Indonesian Communist Party, knows this. "Everything is bad for the Americans," he told me joyfully. "There is no way out for the U. S. imperialists. They thought Malaysia as a member of the UN Security Council was a good thing for them. But, on the contrary, they got Malaysia and lost Indonesia." The discerning visitor to Asia can readily perceive the hollow ring "they got Malaysia" brings to Asian ears. But even the London press is speculating that, because of multiple forms of internal strife, the Federation of Malaysia will disintegrate and dissolve. The British miscalculated on their defunct Central African Federation and West Indies Federation. Wrote one Djakarta editorialist: "Such is the dynamics and durability of puppetry! In all but name the British still rule in Malaysia."

When Prince Sihanouk followed Sukarno on a state visit to the White House, President Kennedy's wry comment on the Indonesian head of state would have applied as well to the Cambodian leader. For over a decade, the Prince has also had to protect his government from would-be assassins, *putschs* and well-financed harassments. In the last several months the new vigor of his attacks on the U. S. may indicate that his patience is running out, or that he is under domestic pressure to force a halt. On overt military attacks the count is high: over 300 border violations by our client states of South Vietnam and Thailand with the toll of dead, missing and kidnapping running into dozens; 78 killed by chemicals sprayed from a plane last July; a U. S. "Special Forces" C-123 plane, with eight Americans aboard, shot down by Cambodian forces last October 24. The wreckage I saw on display in Phnom-Penh had been spat upon by angry Cambodians.

The Prince's closest personal brush with death came six years ago. Thanks to imperial rivalries over predominant "influence" in his country, he escaped. For years, the French and British have been unhappy when, ejected from one colonial situation after another, they observe soon afterwards a *de facto* American replacement. It was from them that he received a tip about an American plot hatched and broached at the September, 1958 Bangkok meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO, wrote Walter Lippmann on September 14, 1954, is "the first formal instrument in modern times which is designed to license international intervention in internal affairs." In that period of the '50s John Foster Dulles had branded the concept of neutrality "dangerous and immoral." Despite personal pleas by the Secretary of State and his CIA brother, Allen Dulles, Sihanouk persisted in his dangerous "immorality" by declining to join SEATO.

"Never mind, SEATO will protect you just the same," U. S. Ambassador McClintock told the Prince. Sihanouk was firm: "But we reject SEATO 'protection.' We have never asked for it. We don't want it. We want absolutely nothing to do with SEATO or any other military pacts." The American *chargé d'affaires* bluntly warned: ". . . if Cambodia goes back on her desire to participate in the war against communism, it can provoke Congress into refusing to Cambodia not only military aid but economic aid as well."

But nothing worked. Although anti-Communist in domestic policy, Sihanouk began working with left wing elements in the interests of internal unity. Externally, to defend his neutrality, he journeyed to Moscow and Eastern Europe to open diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc. In 1958 he recognized China. Commented the British weekly *Peace News:* "Only a foolish man would attempt a dangerous street crossing with eyes to the right or to the left alone, and Norodom Sihanouk is no fool."

Unlike Washington, two of the old colonial powers in Asia have learned to move with the times. The French and the Dutch have abandoned "dark schemes hatched in secret." They maintain good relations with former colonies. As America's reputation in Asia has sunk to lower and lower levels, the prestige of President de Gaulle among anti-colonial forces has risen. He masterfully negotiated an end to the fighting in Algeria and accepted decolonization. Why, ask Asians, did not a man of John F. Kennedy's intellect display the same realism toward Cuba, Vietnam and China?

For years Walter Lippmann has written of "our moral and intellectual unpreparedness for the reality of things." He was keenly disappointed that the new and vigorous Chief Executive did not start to re-educate the American people during the momentum of his 100 day honeymoon. In mid-1961, on a television broadcast, he observed that Kennedy had missed an historic opportunity to build an indispensable popular base for a new and realistic foreign policy. Lippmann understood that, in the final analysis, all efforts to find solutions to international problems become domestic problems. In every government, for every proffered solution, someone has to account to a domestic public. The greatest irony is that the China and Cuba boycott policies have served neither national interest nor the wider needs of the world community. These two emotional binges have been a pandering to the lowest common denominator of popular American ignorance. From the start, policies on Vietnam have been made without any pretense of consulting the people and presenting them with all the facts.

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Powerful though the presidency is, Kennedy was still only one man. His failure to puncture myths and to set the country right-side-up does not absolve other elements of the society, including the press, of the same overdue obligation. From half way around the world I perceive little at home to cheer, much to cause despair. Throughout the entire postwar era, when a frightened and misguided nation was slipping ever deeper into foredoomed support of Diems, wild political exiles, "former" Nazi generals and a politics of violence, the press at almost any moment could have forced a healthy national debate. By abdicating, by ignoring its historic duty, by becoming an uncritical instrument of a colonialist international line, the U. S. communications media have made themselves suspect among a billion revolutionary people.

Perhaps the most serious indictment of daily press performance can be made of its fuzzy criteria for newsworthiness. Both consciously and unconsciously, certain vital stories are killed because Communism is in some way involved. On news desks, deep visceral political reactions of ethically weak and emotionally insecure individuals can be decisive; one does not have to postulate a conspiracy theory.

When I conversed with President Sukarno at Bogor Palace, he referred to the lasting damage that the American press has often done to the cause of United States-Indonesian understanding. In a long article last May for *Le Monde Diplomatique* in Paris, he spelled out his strong feelings:

> *"The forces against which we struggled had still another weapon in their armory: propaganda, a weapon they turn against us without ceasing and without the least regard for the truth.*
>
> *"Let there be a molehill, they will make a mountain of it. Let there be a mote in our eye, it is a beam to them—a beam put there 'accidentally on purpose'. If there is a mere difference of opinion among us, they cry havoc. If there is drought or flood and a bad harvest, they cry economic corruption and mismanagement. If there is an attempted* coup, *they have the whole country rising against a dictatorial government. If our youth demonstrates against some blatant act of neo-colonial domination, they have Dutch heads rolling in the gutters, or British women and children in peril of their lives. And always, at all times, on all occasions and at every opportunity, they chant: Communism, Communism, Communism—all is Communism.*
>
> *"Thus cloaked by the anti-Communist cry and a furious smokescreen of abuse and misrepresentation and outright lies, the forces of the old order in the world fight tooth and claw to maintain their vested privileges and to protect the interests they claim as theirs as though by divine right. And in this way, the difficulties natural to our situation have been willfully compounded by reaction many times over."*

Asia of course has been victimized by the morally corrupt writers and propagandists. But equal damage to East-West understanding results when, for example, an American reporter makes no effort to remain detached and to weed out his strong personal antipathies. In February, U. S. Ambassador Jones asked Dr. Ruslan Abdulgani, the Indonesian Cabinet Minister who coordinates information programs, to grant an interview to Robert Kleiman, visiting correspondent of the *New York Times*. To accommodate the reporter's schedule, Dr. Abdulgani received him at his home on the evening of February 9. Later, following Kleiman's hasty departure from the country—so far as I have been able to ascertain, he was not deported—the Minister's account of an extraordinary half-hour appeared in the Indonesian press:

"Minister Abdulgani, who received the sting of an 'Ugly American,' related that Kleiman had described Indonesia's opinion as 'nonsense' when the Minister contended that Malaysia was created as a neo-colonial base encircling this country. . . . Kleiman accused Indonesia of being ungrateful when Minister Abdulgani outlined to him Indonesia's reasons for pulling out from the UN. Kleiman also said that Indonesia was ungrateful towards the USA which had helped this country in winning its independence. . . . He said Indonesia was also ungrateful to America for its efforts in winning back West Irian (New Guinea). . . . It was Robert Kennedy who returned West Irian to Indonesia's lap, Kleiman was reported by Minister Abdulgani as saying, despite the Minister's contention that West Irian was won by Indonesia herself. . . . Kleiman later told Minister Abdulgani that Indonesia would come kneeling to America to help it out from Communist China's grip. Minister Abdulgani cut short the interview and asked Kleiman to leave his house." Antara news agency later reported that President Sukarno fully backed Dr. Abdulgani's action.

Shortly before being transferred from Washington to another post, Indonesia's ambassador to the United States, Zairin Zain, told the *Baltimore Sun*, in late January, that "the costly 15-year United States aid program to Indonesia probably did more harm than good." The Ambassador made charges often levied elsewhere in Asia.

> *"During Indonesia's fledgling years foreign powers almost forced the Djakarta government to accept development loans which today are causing severe repayment problems. All too often, these loans were used to finance big prestige projects in population centers which disrupted rather than improved the nation's overall economy.*

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"Development grants were humiliating because they were given in a way that made recipients feel like beggars who should be profuse and specific in their thanks.

"Under the Food-for-Peace program surplus American crops have been sold to Indonesia for soft local currency. While this might have saved Indonesia the strain of payments in hard currencies, the rupiah payments for American foodstuffs disrupted the internal monetary structure and caused inflation. This in turn promoted smuggling. The people of Indonesia live on 3,000 islands. Smuggling has been a particular problem in the islands around Singapore.

"Many aid officials who went to Indonesia have shown no appreciation for the country's history, no knowledge of its social structure, no sensitivity for its values and feelings."

Early in February, the Japanese journal, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, reported that the United States has lost much of its enthusiasm for giving aid in competition with the Soviet Union in light of the prevailing *détente*. The *Indonesian Herald* cited the Japanese analysis as evidence that politics, not humanitarianism, has been the driving force behind the aid program.

Like other leaders of the New Emerging Forces, President Sukarno appears to be uneasy over India's move from Nehru's early neutrality policy into a position of "neo-alignment in the American camp." Last April, some of the Asian-African foreign ministers met in Bandung to prepare for the Second Conference of Heads of State, now scheduled to open on June 29 in Algiers. Sukarno addressed the ministers. Without calling India by name, he referred to the deteriorating economic situation she finds herself in despite "special" attention she is receiving from a host of Western aid specialists, leading banks and international institutions:

"I heard just now from the Geneva Conference on Trade and Development. It seems that there is a certain sub-continent which of recent years has received an inflow of capital and aid to the sum of $23 billion. Flowing out of the same area in the same period, $13.4 billion went in interest, profits and dividends. And the deterioration in the terms of trade accounted for a loss of some $10.1 billion more.

"What sums are these—and what a balance! Twenty-three billion dollars flowing in; $13.4 billion, plus $10.1 billion flowing out. Five hundred million dollars more flowed out than ever flowed in! Five hundred million more flowed out of that region!

"What is this? The investment of capital that leads to the growth of the under-developed? The granting of aid to start off the process of self-propelling growth? I think not, Sisters and Brothers. What is it but a fresh pattern of domination and exploitation?"

After leading the fifth largest nation out of the United Nations, Sukarno promptly sent Foreign Minister Subandrio to Peking, first to "coordinate" the Chinese and Indonesian revolutions of 750,000,000 persons, and then to tie in more effectively with the world revolution, including the Negro revolution in the United States. Before 1965 ends, the world will see flesh and bones on the long-discussed concept of A-A and AAA (Asia, Africa and Latin America) solidarity.

Soon after the June A-A conference in Algiers, Sukarno almost certainly will convene a Conference of the New Emerging Forces (CONEFO). Early in Feb-



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ruary he publicly suggested the site here in Djakarta. The distinction between the two gatherings will be clear. Based on geography, the June meeting will bring together countries as widely disparate as Haile Selassie's feudalistic, pro-American monarchy and the People's Republic of China. Except on the clearest issues, such as South Africa, the degree of possible cooperation is considerably circumscribed.

Political and ideological lines will become much easier to draw in CONEFO, which is a long time Sukarno dream. Since the U. S. and Britain will never permit a retooling of the UN in accord with A-A demands, CONEFO will logically lead to the establishment of a revolutionary rival. I believe the West, already alarmed by just the suggestion, will be surprised at the number of prospective members. The concept encompasses revolutionary governments, underground and exile revolutionary movements, and what Sukarno calls "progressive forces in the Capitalist countries."

BLAMING THE IDEA ON CHINA, attributing to it an anti-white motivation, the *New York Times* saw in its realization "a nightmare alliance." But to peoples still living under the nightmare of colonialism and racism, CONEFO and its follow-up permanent organization will have enormous appeal. Where neo-colonialism is deemed to hold sway – in Thailand, the Philippines, Laos, South Korea, Britain's new Federation of South Arabia, parts of Africa, virtually all of Latin America except Cuba – the new revolutionary body would play an agitational and financial role. By coordinating sources for arms, guerrilla training and other direct support, it could tip many scales for change in this decade.

Weak even in their own history, Americans are hardly expert at spotting historical turning points in the outer CONEFO world. In the early 1950s one such crossroads slipped by almost unnoticed. Fed up with her futile protests to Washington, the moderately Socialist and pro-Western government of Burma under U Nu indignantly renounced United States economic aid when the CIA stubbornly continued to finance disruptive activities by Koumintang military remnants in remote areas near the sensitive China border. U Nu, then Prime Minister, placed the dignity of Burmese sovereignty above the importance of dollar aid. His government has been succeeded by one far more radical, to which Dr. Subandrio of Indonesia paid a visit in January on his way to Peking. Perhaps Burma will attend CONEFO as well as the Algiers session.

Sukarno's famous "Go to hell with your aid" remark to U. S. Ambassador Jones – closely followed Cambodia's renunciation of all aid. Once again, the CIA and the military were involved. The United States had decided to support the new and supposedly independent nation of Malaysia which, in fact, even some British Laborites conceded is run from London. A succession of other instances of aid renunciation will follow, marking the spreading conviction that the have-not nations will not collapse if United States aid, United States investment and Yankee tourists are cut off because of Washington's political displeasure. On crucial issues in the General Assembly, Adlai Stevenson will henceforth be scrounging for votes to replace some that heretofore have been automatic.

King Canute was objectively a fanatic. Our politicians today are also fanatics, standing athwart the revolutionary tide, projecting everywhere a cruel image of neo-colonialist backlashers. At home, a backlasher professes to favor racial equality; his objection, he argues, is against the movement's pace or method, or both. From aircraft carriers in distant waters and from billion dollar bases in other people's lands we claim to have retained our anti-colonial and anti-militarist traditions. But we behave remarkably like the camouflaged bigots who "aid" a civil rights organization with a $5 contribution, try to slow down its progress and then strike out violently if a Negro moves next door.

Whatever it is we think we are defending, from Seoul to Caracas via Leopoldville and Johannesburg, will have been decisively taken from us before this decade expires. A rash of political arrests during February in South Korea where the desire for reunification with the prosperous and reconstructed North is strong; anti-Yankee demonstrations and resumption of Huk activity in the Philippines; a large and violent anti-Malaysia "Tommy Go Home" demonstration on February 13 in Malaysia's capital – these are among the unmistakable auguries.

Conditioned to conditioning, victimized by an effective if hidden domestic propaganda apparatus, we give every sign of continuing along the same path that is already strewn with disaster. The cost in lives and treasure, the enmity of unborn generations will be wholly without recompense. For a brief while it will be possible to go on solemnly believing that grace and deity are on the American side. But we'd be wiser to heed Sukarno's warning that "not even the gods in heaven can stop the flow of history."

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4.
A VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

by
Marcus Raskin

SINCE WORLD WAR II American policy makers have developed America's foreign relations role as that of world policeman. We assumed this role in Vietnam, a place where we did not begin to comprehend the complex cross-currents of politics, nationalism, personality, tradition, history, and other people's interests. To support this policeman policy our military and CIA programs in Southeast Asia grew to mammoth proportions without rhyme or reason. These programs often reflected little more than the power struggles of the agencies of American bureaucracy, rather than anything that went on in Asia. A report on *Vietnam and Southeast Asia* prepared for four Senators at the request of President Kennedy in 1963 stated:

> "*It should also be noted, in all frankness, that our own bureaucratic tendencies to act in uniform and enlarging patterns have resulted in an expansion of the U.S. commitment in some places to an extent which would appear to bear only the remotest relationship to what is essential, or even desirable, in terms of U.S. interests.*"

The United States, by the military and covert way it operated in Vietnam in the past ten years, has nurtured strong anti-white and anti-Western feelings in Southeast Asia. Whether we called it "responsibility" or empire, the facts were that the United States succeeded to the Japanese and French hegemony in Asia without really knowing why or with what purpose. Empires are very seldom built by design. They start almost accidently: their dynamics and actions define what they are. Each empire has its own characteristics, although historically they all seem to involve defense of some allies, suppression of certain regimes in favor of others, and a powerful ideology. Ultimately, there are common characteristics in the lack of judgment on the part of leaders who no longer are able to distinguish between real and chimerical interests because of the empire's octopus-like tentacles. Those tentacles, especially if they include extensive military involvement, strangle the judgment of its leaders.

Relating to Vietnam militarily has camouflaged America's real interests and distorted the type of diplomacy and politics which should be employed there. The methods we have followed in Vietnam may not be without their costs in terms of our own nation's stability and freedom of choice. Thus, when we ask the military to undertake projects which are inherently unmilitary, we are courting great danger. It is overdramatic to say that the United States will be faced with a French Organization de L'Armee Secrete (OAS) situation with our military if we substantially expand the war, and then attempt an accommodation, but such seeds are easily sown. For example, the official American policy in South Vietnam is to support a civilian government, but the rank and file military, including high ranking American military officers on the scene, support the South Vietnamese military. Bad habits are learned in such wars and they may too easily be applied at home.

It is hard for American civilian leadership to learn that the military is not a machine which can be started and stopped by pressing a button. By definition of their mission, the military want to follow through to a military victory. We will find that each day American policy makers procrastinate on a political settlement, the war will escalate upward militarily on its own momentum. In this regard the military bureaucratic course of the war is quite instructive. The "special forces" and the army were the military forces under President Kennedy who were given responsibility for the war. After the apparent failure of these forces to pacify the country, the Air Force lobbied for involvement. Using the Gulf of Tonkin as the pretext, the Air

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Force sent planes to South Vietnam as a "deterrent." But "deterrents" are vulnerable and can be easily destroyed by guerrillas as these were at Bien Hoa. Here the psychology of the paper tiger played its part. The Air Force's pride was wounded and it decided to prove itself through greater involvement. Once this occurred, the Marines and the Navy (but less so) lobbied successfully for an expanded role. Not to be outdone, the Army also wanted increased participation. This was also granted by the White House. Finally, the Strategic Air Command (SAC), in a non-nuclear way also wanted in. Paradoxically, the military may have wished for that involvement because they feared that the war would end – the "politicians" might negotiate military withdrawal before they had a chance to test themselves in battle. Because of such a massive military involvement in the war, in a political sense it became very hard to impress our opponents of peaceful intentions or to counter those groups in the American government and the public who want a "win" in the military sense.

The Vietnamese operation as a military venture is not one in which very many can take particular pride. The bad habits of that war have included torture, napalming, defoliation, and inability to understand what means could yield suitable ends. Although governments are, by their nature, notoriously uncritical of themselves, democracies, by their nature, have a better chance of holding their governments and the actions of individuals in government, to account (even though personal responsibility for actions is not a very fashionable virtue in government). Too often men in government are expected to operate by inverted meanings of responsibility and morality or to forget about them. This sort of "responsibility" and "morality" can be seen in Vietnam. Where, as in the case of Vietnam, three out of four Americans, until the middle of 1964, were not even aware that the United States was involved militarily, officials seem to have felt themselves free to allow sadistic and totalitarian methods in the name of fuzzy objectives. Such methods spread easily, and unthinkingly, in governments. It is best that they be exposed and terminated.

With the realization that neither the United States alone nor the Western powers together can dictate a result in Southeast Asia, does there remain any role which these countries can play in that area? Most certainly it is not that of policeman or white man's burden for Asia. That lesson was learned, or should have been, ten years ago. Perhaps the moderately clever learned it at the end of World War II. Nor is it likely that pacts such as SEATO, which do not comprise the great nations having real or geographical interests in Southeast Asia – Japan, India, and Burma – can ever mean anything. If the great powers are to exercise a role, and if there is to be a longterm settlement, it will have to be in concert with other nations: that is, through the United Nations. Although the present line of the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese is to oppose U.N. involvement, because they fear that the Geneva and Laotian Agreements would be scrapped, any new settlement would necessarily be predicated on those agreements. The purpose of U.N. involvement would be to guarantee their terms.

WHILE THE U.N. MACHINERY appears to the West to be unwieldy and in need of much improvement, the facts are that the U.N. in the Southeast Asian area has done more to stabilize that region than either the SEATO arrangement or the American military intervention. For example, the U.N. was instrumental in ending the 1961 Laotian crisis whereas SEATO was unable even to agree on what the crisis was. The prob-

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ability is that America's allies in SEATO would be more likely to act under U.N. direction than under SEATO auspices in Southeast Asia, since SEATO, as an international or regional institution, has absolutely no moral or political force behind it. Furthermore, the nations of Southeast Asia are more favorably disposed to the U.N.—because of the voting power of the Afro-Asian and Latin American nations in the General Assembly—than they are to pact alliances which are comprised principally of white Western powers. The prescription of action is not an easy one, for it will mean that we shall have to reconsider how the United States is to relate to the world, and to itself. No doubt there are other courses that parallel the one I outline. The policy I have drawn is illustrative, as any policy must be, until it is put to the hard test of negotiation and practice.

1. Recently more and more evidence has been reported in the United States about the torture and napalming of the Viet Cong and peasants by the South Vietnamese Army, with either American participation or acquiescence. This brutality and torture can only revolt those who are concerned with politics rather than sadism. We cannot control the torture of the North Vietnamese. We are responsible for what we do and for what our agents do. In the spirit of shouldering our responsibility we must immediately put a stop to the bombings and torture now either allowed or sanctioned by the United States. That policy is short-sighted politically and foolish militarily. It has not resulted in *any* advantage to the United States. If a political settlement is the objective and elections are held, those South Vietnamese who supported the torture and napalming will be defeated. The South Vietnamese we support and prop up will change only when we change. When that happens, they may be able to retain some favor in their own country.

Although there is evidence which makes clear the historic roots of torture in Indochina as a method of politics, there is sufficient evidence to show how Western methods have updated the more "primitive" Vietnamese ways. At the very least, we should adopt and enforce the Prisoners of War (POW) and Red Cross conventions as they apply to the Vietnam war. There is still another point to the sadism and torture. Bureaucracy and organization may involve itself in such things almost antiseptically. That is a dangerous trend in government and should be stopped. An independent investigation (along the lines of the Warren Commission) of the activities and directives of American personnel in the conduct of the war would do much to restore responsibility in statecraft. Such an investigation would help set standards by which the various agencies of the American government operate internationally. (The new CIA Director could benefit greatly from this.)

2. Under the 1954 Geneva Accords an election was to have been held in July, 1956 in South and North Vietnam to determine the type of government it would have as a unified nation. A conference of the 14 powers, similar to the Laos negotiation but now with U.N. sponsorship, should be convened (provided for in Article 4, Geneva Accords of 1962) to negotiate a permanent cessation of all military activities. As evidence of its good intentions, prior to the convening of the conference, the United States should stop bombing North Vietnam. The United States, as a member of the 14 nations' conference, should join with the other Great Powers in guaranteeing the borders of the area. The conference would draw the outlines for a confederated state of Vietnam which would come into existence after certain agreed upon conditions were met. The International Control Commission (ICC) or another body agreed upon, would act as the investigator-enforcer. (It should be recalled that this method was adopted in the Palestine-Israeli situation and has worked well.) A political amnesty in both North and South Vietnam would be declared and all elements of the population, North and South, would be free to seek political representation by democratic means. This would be enforced by the ICC under U.N. sponsorship. North and South Vietnam would be admitted to the U.N. as separate states. Once confederation was achieved the Vietnamese would have single representation.

3. The ICC could be greatly strengthened if it received its authority from the U.N., and became a responsibility of the U.N. Its task would be to investigate complaints, act as a police force, conduct the initial elections in Vietnam and make continuous reports to the U.N. about any border difficulties. Responsibility for serving on the ICC would rotate among U.N. members. Payment for this activity would come from the Great Powers to the U.N., earmarked for the ICC. Further, with United States' support, the ICC would act to negotiate out differences between Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and North and South Vietnam that have mounted over the past ten years.

4. The situation in Laos will continue to deteriorate unless the United States undertakes diplomatic means to stop the war in Vietnam. To ensure Laotian stability, the United States should now lead an effort to give the ICC greater power and authority to act in the entire Southeast Asian sector. The ICC should request, through U.N. good offices, troops from Burma, the Philippines, Nepal, New Zealand, Yugoslavia, and Algeria. They would police borders and serve as an inspection unit for arms control in the area. National responsibility for troop detachments would be on a rotational basis.

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5. The United States, through the U.N., should offer aid to Laos, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand in fashioning a common market between themselves, with a customs and payments union, emergency funds to finance special quick payoff projects (United States and U.N. files are bulging with such projects) and a long-term economic development project such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for Southeast Asia. Indeed, it could use the Special Fund as its primary instrument for some of these projects. The Mekong River project, which is a striking plan for land and water development, has united Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam in this development activity. It is even said by those involved in the project that the Pathet Lao support the Mekong Delta project and that the North Vietnamese would too, if it were extended into their area.

Correlatively, a "planning bank," whose directors would be Cambodia, North Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, South Vietnam, the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, could direct the expenditure and planning of short-term projects in South and North Vietnam, and the Mekong Project in Southeast Asia. The planning bank could be funded by these powers under authority of the U.N. using the Economic Commission for Asia in the Far East (ECAFE) as its "parent." The organizational structure of the planning bank would allow for inclusion of both donors and recipients as board directors. The People's Republic of China would be invited to join in one of these capacities.

6. The United States should now compensate for the bombings of Cambodian territory, the destruction of their villages, their total innocents, and their land.

The North Vietnamese are anxious for trade with the South. Except for food which they received from the Russians in 1955, the North Vietnamese would have continued the war in 1955 to obtain rice. They will do so in the future unless they are able to obtain rice from some source. The resumption of trade and the normalization of relations with North Vietnam is a small price to pay for stabilizing the situation in the Indochinese area. Like South Vietnam, North Vietnam has been under a crushing military and economic burden. Its leadership has been fighting for 25 years and is concerned that North Vietnam will lose everything in a war that could spread to their territory – and to keep control of their country from the Chinese and the Soviet Union. This can only be accomplished in the context of peace. In a widened military action the Chinese almost certainly would move a large military force into North Vietnam.

The North Vietnamese position as supported by the Chinese and the Russians has been reasonably consistent since the Geneva Conference of 1954. Their demands flow from the Geneva Accords themselves. On February 4, 1955, they proposed restoring normal road, rail, sea, air, and postal relations between the two zones (as promulgated in the Geneva Accords) and general elections. The problem with the Geneva Accords was that no nation which felt any responsibility for stability in Southeast Asia cared to guarantee the agreements of that conference. France was in no position to carry out a guarantee for the whole of Vietnam as enunciated in the Accords, especially in the face of American objections. If a Geneva Conference were held along the lines of the 1954 conference with the difference being that the United States would join and guarantee the results, the probability is that Vietnam would maintain – or attain – an existence independent of Communist China.

Barring the inability of the United States to control its appetite for military involvement, there is a reason for some cautious optimism. There are two strong political currents in Southeast Asia. One is nationalism and the other is fear of Chinese domination. The direction of North Vietnamese and future South Vietnamese leadership (assuming it is to have any sort of indigenous mass support) will be to achieve national political identity for their nations. This means that the local political and military leadership will work to lessen the influence of the Great Powers (United States, France, China, and the Soviet Union) in Southeast Asia. They are aware that they cannot get very far by having outside troops prop up their regimes or by being wholly dependent upon outside forces politically, diplomatically, or economically.

No doubt this attitude will cause the Great Powers some consternation, since historically they have used the region of Southeast Asia as a pawn in their game. However, that age of international politics is over. Will Communist China abide by that view? There is no question that United States relations with China will soon enter a new stage. To no little extent what the United States does will drastically affect Chinese activity. If the United States helps in fashioning the political concerns of Southeast Asia on real issues – water, food, and electric power – we will be in a better position of blunting Chinese power because the Southeast Asian nations will have a reason for being independent. If we make it possible for China to participate in such projects peacefully we will have accomplished much in recognizing the legitimate interests of 650 million people and will have discouraged both their unreal interests and ours. Settlement of the Vietnam war can be used as an opening wedge for improving relations with Communist China in this next period of international affairs. The risks of that policy for the United States are incomparably less than a "holy" war with China – which can only result either in a nuclear episode or a prolonged land war which the United States would probably lose on China's mainland.

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

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Rabbi Leo Baeck wrote his monumental account of Jewish life and Jewish people (*This People Israel: The meaning of Jewish existence*), in dark times. Part of the book was written on scraps of paper—in secret.

While Rabbi Baeck labored under the stress of the concentration camp to produce his witness, artists and authors of another generation were producing a witness of their own. Their testimony transcends the limits of race, nation or religion. Theirs is a universal testimony; they speak for the world of children.

The Town of Terezín, Czechoslovakia, founded over 200 years ago by order of Emperor Joseph II—"a sleepy army garrison"—was transformed by the Nazis into a "model camp" (Theresienstadt), calculated to convince the Red Cross that adults and children could live together as inmates. In reality it was a place of "famine and fear," a stopping place on the road to the extermination ovens.

Fifteen thousand Jewish children passed through the gates of Terezín. Only 100 survived.

"They saw everything the grown-ups saw. They saw the endless queues in front of the canteens . . . the funeral carts used to carry bread and the human beings harnessed to pull them." They saw the executions and the piles of coffins.

They saw things the grown-ups didn't want to see. They saw beautiful green meadows and bluish hills beyond the gates, animals and birds and butterflies, their homes with curtains on the windows, a kitten with a saucer of milk.

They saw things grown-ups cannot see: wizards, witches and "jesters and bugs with human faces, a land of happiness where for an admission of one crown, there was everything . . . cookies, candy, a roast pig stuck with a fork from which milk and sodapop trickled . . . All this they drew and painted. They loved to paint and draw, from morning till evening."

But their poetry is in a different mood. It speaks of loneliness, longing and *fear*—the fear of the con demned. They were conscious of their status.

(title page) Detail of central part of paper cut out . The artist, Hanus Weinberg, lived in boys' dormitory number II. Born—in Usti nad Orlicí August 18, 1931; deported to Terezín—December 5, 1942; died at Oswietim extermination center—December 15, 1943.

(right) Watercolor on grey paper by Helena Schanzerová. Helena lived in building CIII, house number 13 and belonged to Group I. Born—in Prague, November 3, 1933; deported to Terezín—July 30, 1942; died—at Oswietim, May 18, 1944.

Verse written in pen on a German office form in a child's handwriting. No information on Bachner could be found. Hanus Löwy born—in Ostrava, June 29, 1931; deported to Terezín—September 30, 1942; died—at Oswietim, October 4, 1944. Miroslav Kosek born—in Bohemia, March 30, 1932; deported to Terezín—February 25, 1942; died—in Oswietim, October 19, 1944.

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The Little Mouse

A mousie sat upon a shelf,
Catching fleas in his coat of fur.
But he couldn't catch her — what chagrin! —
She'd hidden 'way inside his skin.
He turned and wriggled, knew no rest,
That flea was such a nasty pest!

His daddy came
And searched his coat.
He caught the flea and off he ran
To cook her in the frying pan.
The little mouse cried, "Come and see!
For lunch we've got a nice, fat flea!"

26. II. 1944 Koleba (M. Kosek, H. Lowy, Bachner)



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Terezín

The heaviest wheel rolls across our foreheads
To bury itself deep somewhere inside our memories.

We've suffered here more than enough,
Here in this clot of grief and shame,
Wanting a badge of blindness
To be a proof for their own children.

A fourth year of waiting, like standing above a swamp
From which any moment might gush forth a spring.

Meanwhile, the rivers flow another way,
Another way,
Not letting you die, not letting you live.

And the cannons don't scream and the guns don't bark
And you don't see blood here.
Nothing, only silent hunger.
Children steal the bread here and ask and ask
and ask
And all would wish to sleep, keep silent and
just to go to sleep again . . .

The heaviest wheel rolls across our foreheads
To bury itself deep somewhere inside our memories.

Mif 1944

Preserved in a typewritten copy. In the lower right-hand corner is the pencil signature, "Mif."

Part of pasted paper cut-outs on tinted paper by Eva Stemová who lived in building L318, house number 14, and at the end, in house L410. Born—in Prague, September 4, 1931; deported to Terezín, December 14, 1941; died—at Oswietim, October 23, 1944.

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Pain Strikes Sparks on me, The Pain of Terezín

Fifteen beds. Fifteen charts with names,
Fifteen people without a family tree.
Fifteen bodies for whom torture is medicine and pills,
Beds over which the crimson blood of ages spills.
Fifteen bodies which want to live here.
Thirty eyes, seeking quietness.
Bald heads which gape from out the prison.
The holiness of the suffering, which is none of my
business.

The loveliness of air, which day after day
Smells of strangeness and carbolic,
The nurses which carry thermometers
Mothers who grope after a smile.
Food is such a luxury here.
A long, long night, and a brief day.

But anyway, I don't want to leave
The lighted rooms and the burning cheeks,
Nurses who leave behind them only a shadow
To help the little sufferers.

I'd like to stay here, a small patient,
Waiting the doctor's daily round,
Until, after a long, long time, I'd be well again.

Then I'd like to live
And go back home again.

Anonymous

Poem preserved in manuscript form, in pen, on a piece of paper torn from a notebook.

Detail from a watercolor by Hana Grünfeldová. Hana lived in Block IV at Terezín. Born—in Veselí na Morave, February 15, 1
deported to Terezín—January 22, 1943; died—at Oswietim, 1944

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

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Fear

Today the ghetto knows a different fear,
Close in its grip, Death wields an icy scythe.
An evil sickness spreads a terror in its wake,
The victims of its shadow weep and writhe.

Today a father's heartbeat tells his fright
And mothers bend their heads into their hands.
Now children choke and die with typhus here,
A bitter tax is taken from their bands.

My heart still beats inside my breast
While friends depart for other worlds.
Perhaps it's better — who can say? —
Than watching this, to die today?

No, no, my God, we want to live!
Not watch our numbers melt away.
We want to have a better world,
We want to work — we must not die!

Eva Picková, 12 years old, Nymburk

Eva Picková was born in Nymburk on May 15, 1929, deported to Terezín on April 16, 1942, and perished in Oswietim on December 18, 1943.

(right) This Poem written in pencil on a sheet of lined paper torn from a notebook; dated "9. III. 1943."

Detail from pasted collage on office form. Drawn by Dita Valentíková who lived in building L410, house 16, and in building C She belonged to Group I. She was born in 1933, "but nothing more is known about her."

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Homesick

I've lived in the ghetto here more than a year,
In Terezín, in the black town now,
And when I remember my old home so dear,
I can love it more than I did, somehow.

Ah, home, home,
Why did they tear me away?
Here the weak die easy as a feather
And when they die, they die forever.

I'd like to go back home again,
It makes me think of sweet spring flowers.
Before, when I used to live at home,
It never seemed so dear and fair.

I remember now those golden days . . .
But maybe I'll be going there soon again.

People walk along the street,
You see at once on each you meet
That there's a ghetto here,
A place of evil and of fear.
There's little to eat and much to want,
Where bit by bit, it's horror to live.
But no one must give up!
The world turns and times change.

Yet we all hope the time will come
When we'll go home again.
Now I know how dear it is
And often I remember it.

9. 3. 1943 *Anonymous*

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Detail from a pencil sketch on tinted paper. The artist, Raja Engländerová, was born in Prague, August 25, 1929, and deported to Terezín January 30, 1942. She is one of the few to have survived Terezín. After the liberation she returned to Prague.



There were 15,000 of them; only 100 survived.

Today we live in the midst of needless suffering willfully and wantonly dispensed to the children of our world. Wherever violence is practiced in the pursuit of adult ideals, children suffer. Wherever adult greed or intolerance prevails, children suffer. They suffer today in the East and in the West, in Southeast Asia and in Alabama.

How many will survive?

Permission of McGraw-Hill Book Company (New York • Toronto • London) to reproduce portions of the book . . . I never saw another butterfly . . . is gratefully acknowledged. The poems and pictures were selected from the archives of the State Jewish Museum in Prague.

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REVIEWS

West's New Morality

THE AMBASSADOR by Morris L. West. New York: Morrow. 275 pp. $4.95.

Reviewed by SAUL LANDAU, *an editor of* Studies on the Left *and a director of the San Francisco New School.*

IF ANY OF HIS READERS have reached the point where they feel that the United States involvement in the Vietnam war is immoral, dangerous and barbaric, Morris West will try to convince them that it is not as simple as all that, that there are men in our diplomatic service who face real moral crises every day, who must deal with *all* the facts, with the cold reality of the Cold War, and who must sometimes arrange murders in order to behave in the best tradition of the *new morality*.

In *The Ambassador* West outlines this new morality, the fine tightrope that requires the quick wit and devotion to the service of a James Bond, and the logical mind of a Thomist. The characters, and especially the heroes, in West's version of the United States Foreign Service (Saigon Division), are morally akin to both the quiet and the ugly American, possessed by the Puritan sense of Godly – or historical – mission, and by the frontier compulsion to help your neighbor whether he wants it or not. The Yankee way of life must be illuminated for the native, yet it is impossible for any but the chosen people in the promised land to achieve the mercantile nirvana that has driven Americans since the 1630s.

The Australian Catholic novelist uses this mentality to build characters and moral themes. Is it any wonder that there is not a real person in the book? That there is no conversation, only pointed dialogue? When the hero, Ambassador Maxwell Gordon Amberly, is assigned to Saigon, he tears himself away from a Zen teacher who was teaching him the path to illumination after the death of a faithful wife.

The Zen teacher leaves him with the symbolic question: "What will you do when they ask you to kill the cuckoo?" We know this is symbolic because otherwise it makes no sense. When he arrives in Vietnam, with a loyal young aide whom he loves like a son, the Ambassador is confronted by a Buddhist monk – burning. Then he discovers a conflict between the CIA chief in Saigon and the ranking member of the embassy over strategy and tactics. The CIA man, with a Jewish name, Yaffa, is plotting a coup with the generals because President Cung (Diem) is no longer the best instrument of United States policy. The embassy man, Adams, thinks Cung has done all he can and that United States policy will be best served by retaining him. In any case, Adams feels the United States Embassy would get involved in determining the policy of another country and everyone knows this is contrary to United States ideals. This is the problem the Ambassador must solve: What will he do with the cuckoo?

Using the real events of 1962 and 1963 as the plot outline, West traces the moral dilemma that confronts the Ambassador. We are introduced to Phung Van Cung, described as a Jansenist saint, whose only failing is that he is aloof from the people.

In an adoring interview in the Jesuit magazine, *America*, West re-

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veals: "The character of the fictional President of Vietnam . . . Phung Van Cung, is very strongly built on the character of former President Ngo Dinh Diem." Surprise!

He is also a little stubborn, but he wants to do the best for his country. He is described as an independent man who loves freedom and democracy – but also as an "intransigent Catholic out of the Middle Ages."

For Morris West the moral conflict is whether to support Cung or to participate in his overthrow – and eventually in his murder. At this point Adams, the moralist, protests, although his morality is clouded by practicality. He offers his resignation (after the coup, of course) so that the policy is not disrupted. While he believes in self-determination, he has not seen enough since 1954 to convince him that the United States has prevented the people of Vietnam from even the possibility of self-determination. His great moral indignation is brought out over the the murder of Diem. In an act of heroism he takes Diem from the Presidential Palace to the House of the Number One Chinese. Here West fosters the myth of Chinese inscrutability. Everyone is afraid of the Number One Chinese in Saigon. His house is safer than the United States Embassy. In any case Cung, the Jansenist saint, after a polite and genteel conversation with the head Chinese, refuses refuge and goes out and gets himself murdered by the corrupt generals (in whose favor the Ambassador has decided).

Most of the book consists of a series of phony dialogues and artificial description, and when sex is thrown in, however briefly, it catches the reader unawares. It is almost as if West were trying to prove that despite his stiff construction and Platonic dialogue there is a human being in the book or somewhere behind it. But even among diplomats is it really so stuffy?

"*That night I went to bed with Maggie Benton. Because she was eager and I was seized with an enormous need to affirm my virility, it was a very satisfying mating for both of us. When it came time to leave, she clung to me and wept a little and we both made beautiful promises. But before the last islands were out of sight, before we were swallowed by the empty air of the Pacific, I had already forgotten her.*"

Suppose that the Ambassador was real, that he did resemble a real United States Ambassador—it makes our prospects all the more frightening. Or West "realistically" describing the way top diplomats discuss policy: The man from Washington is delivering the orders to the Ambassador, just before he goes to bed with the woman, who is never again mentioned in the book and has nothing to do with either the "philosophical" dialogue or the plot.

Is it McGeorge Bundy who meets the Ambassador in Hawaii?

"*Come on Max! We're old pros, the pair of us. To hell with all the bloody theoreticians. . . Let's have a swim and a drink. Maybe Maggie will take you to bed tonight! She's still a beauty, and she always did have a big yen for you!*"

"*It was good advice and I tried to take it. I surrendered myself to Maggie's effusive welcome. I changed into swimming trunks and drank Planters Punch on the lawn overlooking the beach. I swam in the warm, clear water, so different from the gray river and the stinking paddy swamps of Vietnam.*"

Are these really the people who make foreign policy decisions or is West a poor novelist, or both? He is not being critical, rather sympathetic to the plight of this man. But reality must be recognized and the way it works is part of that dilemma. The cynical Washington man says to the Ambassador,

"*If the generals take over we have to live with them.*"

"*But the generals won't move without a sign from us. And that sign has to say that we will continue to back their Government in South Vietnam with aid and money and military support.*"

"*So here's how we place the bets: money on the nose for the generals and a dollar on Cung to show. . . This is Washington, remember! This is democracy in action. . . It comes from the man at the top. But there's nothing in writing. There's no formal directive. . . If the generals win we had no part in it. If they lose, we pull you out and send a new man to make a new start with the Cung regime. It's rough, Max, I know, but that's the way it goes. Any objections?*"

"*No.*"

And there are no objections, except by Adams and finally by the young aide who infiltrates a Buddhist monastery and is murdered. But the objections are over minor issues, the most important of which is the murder of Cung: The killing of the Cuckoo. Cung, for all his stubbornness, is seen by West as the one hope against the Communist takeover. History according to West was changed because of a personality defect. In his *America* interview West said: ". . . Diem did an enormous job. The country was served well by him; he was truly *bene meritus*. And the country remembered this. The country wanted him, the Americans wanted him. . . It was just that he himself, by defect of personality, could not measure up to it. This is the tragedy that happens to people."

This squares with the *America* thesis on Diem: a Catholic dictator can't be all bad, although he is of course, subject to the failings of human nature – original sin and all that.

In the novel West accuses the Buddhists of allowing themselves, because of the tolerance of their

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faith, to become infiltrated by Viet Cong Communists, and this is not just a fictional assertion. He told his Jesuit interviewer: ". . . I do believe that the Communists have strongly infiltrated the Buddhist movement in Vietnam." It is inconceivable that the Reds infiltrate the Catholics. Buddhists, of course, are vulnerable to this sort of thing.

West celebrates Cung (Diem) as the only moral man in the book, the only hero. The Ambassador might have been moral if he had behaved more in accord with his inner vision, which he learned from a Japanese Zen priest. This would have been to leave everything alone, for time cures all, and life itself is penance for sins. But he is a true American, as are all the Americans, frontiersmen with a mission that can't wait. However, the Ambassador can't bring the irascible Asian premier under United States control, namely, that he spend more time fighting the Viet Cong and less time persecuting Buddhists. We find out later, of course, that Cung was right all along because the Buddhists were tools of the Viet Cong.

TWO PAPER CHARACTERS are introduced in the book, one of which is clearly the author. He is an Australian novelist who meets the Ambassador and is asked to report on his conversation with the Premier. He does so willingly, becoming an agent of the United States government. He confirms the idea that the Premier is stubborn, i.e., unwilling to follow United States orders to the letter. West admits in *America* that "I gave at least moral assent to his (Diem's) death. You see, I had made some reports at the time to both the Australians and the Americans about my interviews with him."

Although West's protagonist, the Ambassador, after almost cracking up over the death of his young aide and the murder of Cung, winds up seeking peace in a Zen monastery, the business of soul salvation is a phony theme. West sympathizes both with the Ambassador and with United States policy: "I didn't envy the Ambassador's position one bit, which is why the book was written in a sense sympathetic to the Ambassador." He makes the moral issue revolve around the murder of Cung, an American stooge to begin with, and even so the most ludicrous and unreal fictional character since James Bond. The real issues, the United States complicity in the subjugation of a people who are Buddhist, who do not want to kill each other, who desire peace and self-determination, and who would probably vote for Ho Chi Minh if allowed—these issues are obfuscated.

The Ambassador, in which every page hints at the undiscovered moral problems about the war in Vietnam, actually contributes to the mystification and confusion about United States involvement in the civil war. The bad guys are the Viet Cong. But who are the good guys? They are the ones concerned about the murder of one man, about whom to support: an irritable President who is fiercely independent or a group of corrupt generals who will follow orders and ultimately serve United States purposes (democracy and

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freedom). These moral questions are so complex, so intricate, that no reader can decide without some shadow of doubt. These are the phony questions, used by a well-known novelist to propagate the very theme that the United States press and State Department have worked hard at establishing: the situation is too morally complicated for any citizen to judge. It is best to leave to Caesar what is in the realm of Caesar.

In the end West sits on the moral fence, despite his righteousness. His interviewer asks him: "What will you do when they ask you to kill the cuckoo? "Yes," replies West. "What will you do when they ask you to kill the cuckoo?"

Millis' Demilitarization

AN END TO ARMS by Walter Millis. New York: Atheneum. 301 pp. $5.95.

Reviewed by ARTHUR I. WASKOW, *Resident Fellow, Institute for Policy Studies and author of* The Worried Man's Guide to World Peace *and the forthcoming* From Race Riot to Sit-in, *1919 and the 1960's.*

SEVERAL GENERATIONS of Americans have learned much of what they know about war and peace from Walter Millis. Millis began his career in 1931 with *The Martial Spirit*, in which he examined the reasons why the United States had fought its first overseas war. During the succeeding three decades he moved deeper and deeper into the heart of the war-peace issue, and built a reputation as one of the nation's most judicious students of military affairs. In recent years, he has begun an examination of the ways in which the war system itself might be abolished. His latest book, *An End to Arms*, presses forward on this most recent aspect of his life and work.

Millis' view of the abolition of war is most unorthodox, in a spirit that can be traced all the way back to the tone of his first book. He has never succumbed to the pompous glorification with which militarists have greeted war, nor to the pompous horrification with which pacifists and internationalists have treated it. As he explained in *The Martial Spirit*, "I have stressed the satiric aspects of the war . . . Every war in modern times has presented precisely the same elements, though ordinarily they are concealed beneath the immense tragedy which war normally involves. Our War with Spain merely offered an opportunity to examine them in one case where that tragedy was not present." As Millis clearly recognizes, the tragedy of war was multiplied many times when H-bombs entered the arsenals. But the satiric aspects of war were multiplied as well, and it is upon the deeper meaning of multiplied satire that Millis chiefly dwells. It is upon the total absurdity of modern war, rather than upon its total destructiveness and wickedness, that Millis rests his belief that war can now be abolished.

To some readers, the "new" Millis, concerned with the abolition of war, seems utterly unconnected with the "old" military analyst. (Thus one bookseller in Washington reports that government officials buy "Millis on war," but not "Millis on peace.") Yet there are two clear roots in the older "Millis on war" which reveal the basis for a flowering of his concern with the end of the war system. One of these roots was exposed in *Why Europe Fights* (1940), a study of the process by which the peace of Versailles grew into the war of Poland. Millis suggested there that the basic blame for the war must be placed neither upon Hitler, although he took "the most active part," nor upon Chamberlain and Daladier, although their weakness, when they might have been firm, helped lead to war—but rather upon the fact that "there was simply no way in which the knobbly building blocks of the European nations could be put together into a stable and working system without a war." Millis did not try to suggest in *Why Europe Fights* what sort of system might hold European states together without a war, but he was clearly searching for an international-systems approach, and was going beyond the analysis of internal drives toward war that had characterized his earlier studies of the American entry into war in 1898 and 1917.

The second, and more directly nourishing root for Millis' recent work was a chapter of *Arms and Men* (1956). This book had reviewed, in terms of technological, political, and social history, the development of American military policy from Concord to Korea. Its last two chapters discuss what Millis calls "the hypertrophy of war," and the baffling problem that hypertrophy posed to military men and their political bosses. By "hypertrophy" Millis meant what can perhaps more graphically be described as elephantiasis. Anyone who recalls the horrifying photograph in our high school geography texts of an African native with elephantiasis trundling his testicles in a wheelbarrow will realize that a limb or an organ can become as utterly useless if it swells up to hundreds of times its normal size as if it had withered away entirely. This, Millis was suggesting, had happened to war. It had grown so

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far beyond the scale of the political ends it was intended to advance that it no longer was of any use to political leaders. "The old certainty of military action as the final answer to every problem – a certainty that has remained with us since the dawn of history – seems no longer available," he explained. "It may be that for final sanctions in our human affairs we shall have to look toward other factors."

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW WAY of cobbling independent nations into a system that would prevent war and the search for a way of conducting international relations by "other factors" have concerned Millis in his most recent work. His concentration upon the uselessness, rather than the wickedness, of modern war has marched parallel with his concentration upon the usefulness, rather than the wickedness, of the national state. It is not the state system itself that Millis wants or expects to be abolished, but the hypertrophied war system which the states have always used. Indeed, he expects the state system to come to full flowering when the internal peace that modern states have been so capable of guaranteeing has been crowned by external peace as well.

Thus Millis in his work on abolishing war spends about as much time on how to protect the internal peacekeeping police of the national states as he does on how to create the international peacekeeping forces that would prevent the reinvention of war. Thus also he spends about as much time on the non-military forms of conflict that already go on in the world, both between nations (as when de Gaulle "goes on strike" against NATO) and within them (as when subversion, revolution, and coups rather than conquest, determine the fate of new nations) as he spends upon the necessity of demilitarizing those forms of conflict that now are violent. Millis holds that there is already more order in the world than we

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Editor-in-Chief of Ramparts Magazine

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usually think, and that what disorder there is, is already more often carried on by non-military means than we usually think. If he is right, we have but a quick, short hop to make into the disarmed world. The only radical act necessary is to stop looking at that short unpaved gap in the road as if it were a yawning Himalayan precipice. The necessary revolution is "only" mental, not institutional.

As one major contribution to this necessary revolution in our perception of the world, Millis develops the concept of "demilitarization." There are two important meanings to his emphasis on "demilitarization," as against "disarmament" on the one hand or "world order" on the other. First of all, demilitarization is a political act whereas disarmament is merely a technological one. Removing the military approach to settling conflicts is the great necessity, and should be the great focus of such institutions as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). The present focus – upon controlling and removing the arms, inspecting their removal, etc. – is mistaken because the act itself will be a comparatively minor one, and will follow naturally and almost inevitably in the wake of an agreement upon demilitarization. Secondly, the concept of demilitarization points to the distinction between military and police uses of armed force. It is only military power that the nations will lose, not the power to police their own social systems internally; and it is only power to police an agreement on demilitarization that world institutions will gain, not the military power to make new law for the world. As Millis explains, "the policeman enforces a law that it is no business of his to make; the soldier makes law that it is not primarily his business to enforce." On the level of world institutions, there will be only "a modicum of world order, not competent to decide basic power issues but capable of insuring that they be decided in the main by nonmilitary and nonviolent means" – in short, police but no army.

This view is not only more worldly and more tied to *realpolitik* than that of the more utopian world federalists and Gandhians, but is an implicit criticism of the presumably *realpolitisch* programs of the United States government itself. Next to Millis the official American views on disarmament seem the veriest utopian cobwebbry. The big research money is spent on discovering how to inspect against the revival of particular weapons if disarmament were ever achieved, but the practically unresearched official assumption about enforcing disarmament (as embodied in the United States "Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World," tabled at Geneva), is that a world peace force must be "so powerful that no state could challenge it." And the director of ACDA, William C. Foster, has said he is convinced that total world disarmament must wait upon "a great world political revolution and perhaps a transformation in the hearts of men." These are the best measures of how wide the short gap in the road – if Millis is right – looks to American officials.

Millis has not yet faced the issue of how this great mistake in perception is to be corrected. In an entrancing and thoroughly non-utopian final chapter, he suggests that by 1983 or so the various present establishments in all the great powers will have thoroughly learned both of the necessary lessons: that war does indeed have incurable elephantiasis, and that the elimination of the diseased limb will be a quick and almost painless operation. For he suggests that within the present generation, it will be possible for governments much like the present ones to write both a "constitution" for the demilitarized world and a detailed program for actual disarmament. Bloody conflicts over the futures of Brazil and South Africa will merely confirm the general belief that war is ineffective. Whether the conflicts themselves will seem important enough that new ways of "fighting" them out will be invented, or will be resolved by agreement of the great powers, Millis does not predict; he simply suggests that one of these two ways, rather than war, will be agreed upon.

But if we agree to all this – and it is most persuasive – there is still the question, "What had persuaded the governments to change their perceptions by 1983?" Millis himself? It is by no means unlikely, though if it is to happen we must somehow persuade Washington officials to buy "Millis on peace" as well as "Millis on war." The simple pressure of international events? But the way in which present officials stubbornly pursue the military means of achieving victory even where they are least appropriate, as in Vietnam, must give us pause; and here it may not be unwise to call Millis' own earlier work back into the discussion.

WHAT MAKES IT less likely now than in 1898, 1917, 1941, and 1950 that the domestic pressures within one or another of the great powers will seduce or force one or another of the establishments into war? The "martial spirit" of 1898, of which Millis wrote so sardonically, is still alive in more than one national state – and may have far more institutional support (though far less international effectiveness) in the hyper-armed powers of today than in the lightly or highly armed powers of the past. The economic pressures toward war that he found partly affected American decisions in 1917, German decisions in 1939, and Japanese decisions in 1941 have not disappeared from the domestic economies of all the great powers – though perhaps they are much less important in those three powers than they used to be.

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Is there no internal political effort that will have to be made in any or all of the great powers in order to get us "from here to there," as Millis calls it? For that matter, are there no internal political changes that are likely to occur as a result of world-wide demilitarization? We need not suggest that the problem of internal political change is insurmountable – and perhaps we do not even need to insist dogmatically that by 1980 it will still exist. But Millis, or others among the new school of disarmament strategists, need to face the question.

Mystery of Evil

THE HOLOCAUST KINGDOM. A MEMOIR by Alexander Donat. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 371 pp. $5.95.

Reviewed by ETTORE DAFANO, *a European refugee now living in retirement in California.*

ORDINARILY THE REVIEWER of a book places himself, consciously or unconsciously, above the author: he commends the merits he sees in the work and criticizes what he feels are its shortcomings. At any rate, he judges. In the case of Alexander Donat's book, this reviewer finds it impossible to assume this attitude. Perhaps because he is himself a Jew and former refugee, or perhaps because he is just a feeling human being, the reading of the book was for him an intensely painful experience, suscitating such strong emotions as to make him doubt his ability to discuss the book at all. With humility he must look up to the author, who was able to tell the story of six long years of suffering at the hands of fellow men in simple language and with a minimum display of emotion.

The detailed account of the confinement of the author, his wife and their small child in the Nazi ghetto at Warsaw, where, with fellow-Jews they were to be "taken care of" by starvation and disease; the systematic burning of the ghetto because death was too slow; the separation of the family, the deportation to various concentration and extermination camps, and the almost miraculous reunion; all this is told with the fidelity of a good reporter and the patience of a Christ. The apparent indifference of the Christian Poles is looked upon more in wonderment than indignation. The few acts of Christian or simply human mercy on the part of some courageous people are described with infinite gratitude.

But we may ask, why should we torment ourselves with this book? Have we not heard enough Nazi atrocity tales? Have we not endured the long agony of Eichmann's trial? Has not enough fuss been raised over *The Deputy?* Why continue to revive memories of past evils about which there is nothing more we can do? The answer is that the book is not past history, done with and happily resolved. It is the story of an average family still living, the youngest member now in his early thirties. They were among the victims of the cruelty and brutality perpetrated by other human beings, many thousands of whom are still living, making love to their wives and raising children, looking and behaving like normal people. Some of them may be postmen, or railroad conductors, shopkeepers, teachers, lawyers. We might meet them in church or work with them at the office. We might sit next to them in the theater or rub shoulders with them in a city bus – people as decent and harmless looking as our next door neighbor. Gentlemen

CONTRACEPTION

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By John T. Noonan, Jr., Prof. of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School

This is the first exhaustive analysis ever made – and it is remarkably incisive and unbiased – on how the Roman Catholic Church saw, sees, and is likely to see man's control of procreation. Mr. Noonan traces the use of a variety of methods and the Church's stand on them from about A.D. 50 to the latest controversy surrounding the use of oral anovulants, and he analyzes the factors which may help shape future attitudes. As a result of this book the author is likely to be recognized as the foremost authority on the history of Roman Catholic doctrine on birth control.

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who today politely beg your pardon if inadvertently they push you in a crowded subway station may be the same ones who once pierced the knapsacks of the deportees with their bayonets to make sure that no baby would be illegally smuggled through. The remnants of the crucifiers and of the crucified somehow must peacefully coexist; they and their offspring must help in the building of the future world.

The author and his family survived the ordeal against all odds. And the fact of this survival is not entirely accidental. There was a will, a determination, when others had given up, a determination to survive in order that the world may know the story. But an integral part of the story is a question, one which haunted the author throughout those six years and to which no answer was really given: Why? Why? Why? This question had to be carried through to the open world, to cry for an answer. A great many of the victims with whom the author came in contact had stopped asking the question (if they had ever asked it). Human beings who are submitted to a systematic process of degradation and dehumanization are left with only the most crude and selfish feelings: hunger, fear, the urge of self-preservation. Only those who in their supreme passion still feel the divine spark have the strength to wonder.

As long as this question remains unanswered, we should not try to forget. We should not leave the book unread in order to relegate uncomfortable thoughts to the subconscious, where they would remain as a hidden poison. We cannot expect Donat to forget, let alone forgive. But his passionate quest for an answer, even by self-accusation, implies the conviction that a meaning to all the seemingly senseless suffering must exist, and that by understanding it, forgiveness can be made possible.

We may ask why the pristine loveliness of life and soul can be twisted into showing the ugly face of hatred, and our eyes be veiled by the blindfold of prejudice and superstition, which appear even under the guise of love and religion. Just before the liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto by arson and shelling, and the deportation of the survivors, Donat's little boy, Wlodek, was rescued by a Christian woman who was fully aware that her act was a crime punishable by execution. When this woman fell prey to blackmailers, she was forced to hide the child in an orphanage in the country. The author lets his son tell of his experiences there in his own words. Wlodek describes how he became attached to a Miss Krysia who saw to it that he was properly indoctrinated. She told him how bad the Jews were, how they drank the blood of Catholics on their holidays. They would kill young children, suck out their blood and put it in jars. Then they would add it to the dough when they made their matzos. If Auntie Maria (the lady who had rescued him) tried to take him back to his mommy, he should run away to the woods. Therefore, Wlodek prayed to Jesus that his parents would never come back for him. In order to save his soul, a Miss Olenka baptized him with holy water and made him promise to give up all Jewish things, including his mother if she ever came back for him after the war. This was in December 1944. That same month a message to the Swiss Jews appeared in the *National Zeitung* of Basle. Signed by 37 Swiss Protestant ministers and religious leaders, it said in part:

"*We celebrate Christmas, the birthday of the Savior, the King of the House of David. We cannot help finally telling you what has disturbed us for a long time as far as you are concerned. The nameless distress of your brothers and sisters weighs upon our souls. It will be doubtlessly an encouragement for you to know that the Evangelic Christians think about you, keep at your side and pray for you . . . The calamities that so many of your brethren have to endure touch us not only for humanitarian reasons. We are fully aware that the powers which today persecute Judaism aim with no less furor against Christianity . . . We are grieved and alarmed to realize that the Jewish people do not recognize the Messiah, announced by the Old Testament as their Savior . . . The Christian nations have not tolerated, through the centuries, the old people of the Covenant, which is Israel, with the patience of the Christ, and this is why they failed in an appalling manner to truly show by acts of justice and humanity that Jesus of Nazareth, rejected by the Jews, is the true Son of God, that He is the great merciful and only Savior also for His own people.* So our guilt is even greater than that of the Jews (emphasis mine). *For, the blindfold was removed from our eyes: 'We have seen His splendor, the splendor of the son incarnate of the Father, full of mercy and truth.' . . . Be assured, dear brothers and sisters, that we pray for you that the faithful God make you surmount all your pains and make you know all His wonderful promises . . .*"

Mankind has a long history of misrepresentations and hatred leading to atrocities. It has also brought forth great humanitarians who have practiced what Dr. Schweitzer calls the "reverence for life." The seeds of both good and evil are still with us, as human nature has not changed since history began to be recorded. Both kinds of seeds are sharply increasing along with world population, and their effectiveness will rapidly mount with the advances of science and technology. The Kingdom of Heaven is upon us, but so is the *Holocaust Kingdom.*

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The Quiet American

THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE by David Halberstam
New York: Random House. 323 pp. $5.95

Reviewed by ROBERT SCHEER

WHATEVER RESERVATIONS America's "reasonable men" may feel about her involvement in Vietnam, they see in David Halberstam living proof of the fact that our democracy is alive and vibrant; that our policies are subject to critical thought. It is for this that the New York Times ace correspondent has been granted the Pulitzer Prize, the Louis M. Lyons Award of the Nieman Fellows of Harvard, the Page One Award of the American Newspaper Guild and the George Polk Memorial Award. It does not deny the appropriateness of this celebration to note that Halberstam's criticism in no sense challenges the fundamentals of American foreign policy.

Halberstam's new book is above all an affirmation of United States innocence, resting its case on the attachment of all known failure in Vietnam to the Diem family. The only mistake that "we" made was to support Diem uncritically at a time when United States pressure might have brought about Diem's reform or his replacement with a more enlightened administration. But even here, the United States is exonerated. We entered the picture in Vietnam at a time when the options were few:

> "*Not only were we getting deeply involved in a situation where we could be no more effective than the established government, we were making a major commitment during a crisis in whose making we had played only a minor part.*"

Halberstam does briefly refer to our "giving military and economic aid" to the French. Had he supplied the figures, a very different picture would have emerged. The United States, in granting the French $2 billion in aid, paid for 80 percent of the cost of the war – without which they would have been forced to discontinue their war much earlier. Halberstam claims that the French killed one million Vietnamese (1 out of every 34). Would it really be unfair for a Vietnamese to hold American aid accountable for a share in this?

Halberstam makes no mention of the elections scheduled in the Geneva accords for 1956. Why? The elections were never held, precisely because Ho Chi Minh was then, as he is today, "*the closest thing to a national hero in both the North and the South.*" Halberstam also ignores the fact that the Diem government's existence between 1954 and 1961 was made possible only by a *major* American commitment to him. His account of this period is deceptive. "A reluctant United States also backed Diem . . . It was a time of human bankruptcy in South Vietname and Diem was the one straw for a grasping America."

Diem, in the three years he lived in the United States, had managed to convince many of the more "enlightened" participants in our political life that he was a democratic alternative to the Communists. On this basis he obtained a near total commitment from the administration and from the American press in support and celebration of the miracle-of-Vietnam of 1954–59.

In any event, Diem's job was difficult, and I think Halberstam has been unfair to him. Ho Chi Minh had been actively leading the nationalist movement for 25 years while Diem was in exile. The bulk of the populace in the South favored that movement and expected it to prevail within a few years. Diem stayed in power because he quickly created (with American aid) a power apparatus that could regiment the population. This was not an aberration of his program, due to personality defects – Halberstam's thesis – but rather the program itself. It is silly to go on about how bad tempered Mme. Nhu was or about the viciousness of her husband or about the arrogance of Diem – this was their strength. There wasn't time for other methods, if one was out to undercut a movement that possessed the roots and accompishments that Ho's did.

Much of what Halberstam writes supports this view of the Diem family's lack of contact with the people other than to harass them. But the stress on Diem's degeneration and the increase in Nhu's power *is* necessary to support another assumption that Halberstam shares with the State Department: that the Diem regime was, in 1959, the victim of "aggression" from the North which justified the commitment of American troops by President Kennedy in 1961.

> "*The new Indochina war was not a spontaneous uprising from the South. It was part of a systematic and calculated conspiracy on the part of the Communist government in Hanoi to take over the South. But it was the most subtle kind of conspiracy, for though Hanoi directed the war, set its pace, controlled its overall strategy and on the international front articulated the propaganda aims of the Vietcong, it did not in those days send North Vietnamese troops to fight in the South. Rather, the troops were Southerners, and captured weapons were usually employed.*"

To maintain this "conspiracy"

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thesis one must again ignore the matter of the Geneva "elections." For if it was the Diem government (and the United States) that ruled out the prospects for peaceful change, it would seem "reasonable" for Ho and his Vietminh to once again take up the sword. They had, after all, made peace only on the condition that Vietnam was to be divided *temporarily*, pending unification of the country through elections. But there is also considerable evidence that the Viet Cong in the South took up fighting against Diem before the leaders of the North thought this to be wise and that they did so in response to the harassment of the Diem regime. Halberstam writes:

> "*This reasoning neatly obscured the difference between a strong and dictatorial government which can guide its population, and this aloof, inefficient, self-defeating dictatorship whose population was more or less in quiet rebellion.*"

If this is the case, then why does one need to assume that the Viet Cong was imposed by the North on an unwilling Southern countryside? Just what is it that "we" are saving these people from?

Halberstam covered the Vietnam story from the Spring of 1962 to the Fall of 1963. Throughout this period he found little evidence of the importation of weapons or men from the North. Yet it was during this same period that the Viet Cong became an army. According to Halberstam's account, the Viet Cong troops and their leaders generally came from the local area where they fought, and their weapons came mostly from the United States, not from China or the Soviet Union. It was *in this period* that the United States had stepped up its armed commitment: troop carriers, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery and armed helicopters. In Halberstam's account it appears that the United States helicopter pilots and military advisors were the only ones on "our" side interested in pursuing the war. He has a stream of anecdotes about Diem's generals and provincial chiefs being goaded into fighting by the pluckier Americans. Ironically, Halberstam relates, most of Diem's appointed leaders in the South were Catholics from the North.

The heroes of Halberstam's book are the American junior officers who advised Diem's troops and the pilots who flew the planes. Halberstam thrilled to their exploits. Writing of his first "mission" with them: "I feel like a boy preparing for the first day of school." On this mission four Vietnamese peasants (not Viet Cong), were accidentally killed by fire from the helicopter.

Halberstam repeatedly states that this is a Vietnamese war – and yet consistently provides descriptions of Americans as the only ones doing the fighting. In these descriptions his writing is devoid of a sense of horror and tragedy. He becomes the "pro" – tough and abstract.

> "*We bore down on one fleeing Viet Cong. The paddy's surface was rough and his run was staggered, like that of a good but drunken broken-field runner against imaginary tacklers . . . I could almost hear him gasping for breath . . . I could see the heaving of his body . . . The co-pilot fired his machine guns but missed . . . Then there was a flash of orange and a blast of heat inside the ship, and the helicopter heaved from the recoil of its rockets. When they exploded the man fell.*"

Nowhere in the book does Halberstam summon a complex or generous portrait of the "enemy." It is to his credit that he tries harder than most, and his failures are therefore more striking.

If David Halberstam had left Graham Greene out of it I would not have undertaken this review. There have been few enough good guys on this Vietnam business without my sniping at one of the more courageous and critical reporters for the Mass Media. But he did frequently draw upon Greene for his images, and as a result I could not help thinking of David Halberstam as the "Quiet American." As such, his own style is far more important to an understanding of what has transpired in Vietnam than the particular descriptive material which he offers. For the "Quagmire" of Vietnam is primarily one of spirit rather than program. Whatever gripes Halberstam may have about the particulars of American politics, he is totally imbued with its style – its glamour. And it is Graham Greene's contribution to have demonstrated just how parochial that style is.

What is involved here is a cultural "imperialism" that is far more irrational and therefore more dangerous than the older economic varieties.

It is this commitment to regulate the style of life of the Vietnamese that was behind the original decision to support Diem. Halberstam used his critique of Diem to get American policy off the hook.

> "*If various political factions could unite, there might be a strong enough base for a viable military approach to a solution. But only an improvement in the military situation can make real negotiations possible.*"

One hopes that the "Quiet American" will for just one instant contain his missionary zeal and doubt the necessity for *his* protection of Vietnamese freedom. But this does not happen, for what Halberstam (and I'm afraid most of us) has learned from all this is something far simpler:

> "*The lesson to be learned from Vietnam is that we must get in earlier, be shrewder and force the other side to practice the self-deception.*"

It's Ben Franklin gone mad.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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